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Abstract
The study of pairings can be considered in so many different ways that it
may not be useless to state in a few words the plan which has been adopted,
and the chief objects at which it has aimed. This is not an attempt to write
the whole history of the pairings in cryptology, or to detail every discovery,
but rather a general presentation motivated by the two main requirements
in cryptology; efficiency and security.
Starting from the basic underlying mathematics, pairing maps are con-
structed and a major security issue related to the question of the minimal
embedding field [12]1 is resolved. This is followed by an exposition on how
to compute efficiently the final exponentiation occurring in the calculation
of a pairing [124]2 and a thorough survey on the security of the discrete log-
arithm problem from both theoretical and implementational perspectives.
These two crucial cryptologic requirements being fulfilled an identity based
encryption scheme taking advantage of pairings [24]3 is introduced. Then,
perceiving the need to hash identities to points on a pairing-friendly elliptic
curve in the more general context of identity based cryptography, a new
technique to efficiently solve this practical issue is exhibited [123]4.
1Joint work with N. Benger and D. Mandell Freeman.
2Joint work with M. Scott, N. Benger, L. Dominguez and E. Kachisa.
3Joint work with Y. Chen, Z. Guan, J. Hu and Z. Chen.
4Joint work with M. Scott, N. Benger, L. Dominguez and E. Kachisa.
Unveiling pairings in cryptology involves a good understanding of both
mathematical and cryptologic principles. Therefore, although first pre-
sented from an abstract mathematical viewpoint, pairings are then studied
from a more practical perspective, slowly drifting away toward cryptologic
applications.
1Introduction
All things that are still to come lie in uncertainty; live
straightway!
L. Seneca
In his essay A mathematician’s apology [63], Hardy justifies that mathematics should
be pursued for its own sake, arguing that, due to its abstract nature, its very uselessness
means no potential misuse to cause harm. At the end of World War II, this view was
shared by other mathematicians, who did not want their work to lead to new destructive
weapons. Therefore, some researchers refocused their work on less applicable mathe-
matics like number theory or algebraic geometry. In a sense, they implicitly agreed
with Hartmanis’ observation that theoretical results that are hard to prove are useless
in practice [78]. In this regard number theory is a very interesting area to investigate,
although as one of its goals for some researchers in the 20th century was not to have
any application, it has become more than half a century later an integral part of our
lives through its use in cryptology.
The etymology of the word cryptology clearly relates to “the science of secrets”.
Hence, as a matter of fact it is not something new, but rather an ancient science, that
faced a real revolution only few decades ago, with the introduction of mathematics at
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Figure 1.1: Modern cryptology
its core.
Hiding information can be achieved by using a secret, that is only known to the
ones allowed to access some given data. This secret, or key, can be of two natures:
symmetric or asymmetric, depending on whether or not the secret used to hide, or
encrypt, the data is the same which must be used to reveal, or decrypt the information.
Denoting symmetric and asymmetric by the letter S and A, respectively, figure 1.1 gives
a picture of how cryptology splits into varied subfields.
The links between mathematics and cryptology appeared during the 1970s, with the
introduction of asymmetric cryptography. In fact, thanks to mathematical problems
hard to solve but that can easily be constructed in practice, it became possible for
anybody to encrypt a message using a public key, known to anyone, and such that only
the owner of the corresponding private key could decrypt it. One of the most important
and intensively studied such problem for the past twenty years is the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP).
From a mathematical perspective it consists in finding the logarithm of a number
2
β, given a generator α of a finite field F. More formally this is stated in the problem
below:
Problem 1 (DLP). Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p, with q = pn, p a prime
and n a positive integer. Let α be a generator of G, a subgroup of Fq. For a given
β ∈ G, find x such that β = αx mod q.
From a cryptographic point of view this problem gives rise to a one-way function,
a function easy to compute in one direction, the exponentiation side, but difficult to
compute in the opposite direction, the inverse of the exponentiation, the DLP.
Although the DLP is extensively used in cryptography we only present the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol [31] as an example on how to take advantage of a
one-way function. If A and B want to start an encrypted discussion then, obviously
they need to share a secret, only known to them. Assuming that A and B agree on
a finite field Fq and a generator α of a subgroup G ⊂ Fq, and that they both possess
a secret xa and xb, respectively, Diffie and Hellman proposed the following solution to
solve their key exchange problem.
• Initial state:
A: Fq, α, xa B: Fq, α, xb
• A sends αxa to B and B sends αxb to A:
A: Fq, α, xa, αxb B: Fq, α, xb, αxa
• A and B compute (αxb)xa and (αxa)xb , respectively:
A: Fq, α, xa, αxb.xa B: Fq, α, xb, αxa.xb
• A and B have a common secret key αxa.xb :
A, B: Fq, α, αxa.xb
3
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Figure 1.2: Security levels
In this protocol clearly A and B cannot recover any information relative to the
secret key of one another without solving the DLP. This small example steers our at-
tention to two main principals on which cryptography relies: security and efficiency.
Although obvious, the first one needs further refinements, while at first glance the
second one may not be important. In fact, security is totally relative to the importance
of the data. Clearly if A tells B in an encrypted conversation that he is leaving
tomorrow, there is no need for this message to be secure over a day. Therefore, when
using cryptography the first thing to know is why we do require cryptography, and
then assess which security level should be matched. Taking into account the best
actual computational power available, a hard problem is considered secure when the
best algorithm to solve it has complexity at least 280, or even 2128 as some argue [101].
Figure 1.2 clarifies how hard it is to solve a problem featuring a given complexity. In
the case mentioned above a security of 256 would be more than sufficient, however when
considering the general case we refer to 280 as the standard security level.
In the case of the Diffie Hellman key exchange protocol, it is required for the stan-
dard security level that Fq have a size expressed by a 1024 bit integer, which in turn,
implies dealing with very large numbers and thus a lower efficiency. In this regard
a breakthrough was made by Miller [94] and Koblitz [77] when they introduced the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), the equivalent of the DLP on
an elliptic curve.
Problem 2 (ECDLP). Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq, and let P be a generator of
a subgroup G of E(Fq). For a given point Q ∈ G, find the integer x such that [x]P = Q.
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This new problem allows shorter keys in cryptographic protocols as the available algo-
rithms to solve the ECDLP are a lot slower than the one to solve the DLP. For instance,
to achieve the same standard security level the key is only required to be 160bits long
when elliptic curves are used, compared to the 1024bits required over a finite field.
From this observation, in 1993, Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone (MOV) [91] had
the idea to transform the ECDLP into the DLP using a map called pairing, weakening
protocols based on the hardness of the ECDLP. However this attack applied only to
elliptic curves that fail the MOV test, that is have a small embedding degree. Then,
at the end of the nineties two other main attacks were published. The first one, which
focuses on the use of Weil-Descent to map the ECDLP to the DLP on hyper-elliptic
curves, is due to Galbraith and Smart [50], while the second one, independently dis-
covered by Smart [128] and Satoh and Araki [117], targets elliptic curves of trace one.
A few years later, pairings have been looked at from a different angle. Instead of using
it destructively such as in the MOV case, one took advantage of some of its properties
in order to construct new protocols.
More formally, a pairing is a map, e from additive groups G1 and G2 into a multi-
plicative group GT , e : G1×G2 → GT . A pairing has three different variants depending
on the groups G1 and G2:
• Type I: G1 = G2
• Type II: G1 6= G2 and there exists an efficiently computable isomorphism from
G1 to G2
• Type III: G1 6= G2 and there exists no efficiently computable isomorphism from
G1 to G2
For some given P1, P2, P ∈ G1 and Q1, Q2, Q ∈ G2 a pairing has the following
properties:
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• Bilinearity:
e(P,Q1 +Q2) = e(P,Q1)e(P,Q2)
e(P1 + P2, Q) = e(P1, Q)e(P2, Q),
• Non-degeneracy:
∀P ∈ G1, P 6=∞ ∃Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1
∀Q ∈ G2, Q 6=∞ ∃P ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1,
• e is efficiently computable.
The most useful property of a pairing is its bilinearity which allows some new
constructions as the one proposed by Joux [72] to handle a tripartite key exchange.
Assuming that A, B and C agreed on an elliptic curve over Fq, a generator P of a
subgroup of E(Fq), a type I pairing and that each one owns a private key xa, xb and
xc, respectively, it works as follows.
• Initial state:
A: E(Fq), P , xa B: E(Fq), P , xb C: E(Fq), P , xc
• A, B and C broadcast Qa = [xa]P , Qb = [xb]P and Qc = [xc]P , respectively:
A: e(Qb, Qc)
xa B: e(Qa, Qc)xb C: e(Qa, Qb)
xc
• A, B and C share the same secret key:
A, B, C: e([xa.xb.xc]P, P ) = e(P, P )
xaxbxc
As in many identity based encryption schemes [17], this protocol relies on the bi-
linear property of the pairing and the hardness of both the ECDLP and the DLP to
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be solved. As such it is of a vital importance to consider, both the security and the
efficiency of the pairings in order to be able to safely use them in the field of pairing
based cryptography.
Our study starts with a high level overview of the mathematics involved so that
the reader can grasp the underlying theory in which algebra, number theory, and al-
gebraic geometry are tightly entangled (chapter 2). This includes many results that
were thought useless and completely abstract when discovered. However, with the in-
troduction of mathematics into the cryptographic world, they became very helpful in
the construction of new secure protocols and as such, are now used in day to day life,
for example in computers, cell phones, credit cards etc. . .
Next, we will survey curves suitable for a pairing, and give an algorithm to compute
the pairing of two given points on an elliptic curve (chapter 3). Then, we present some
criteria to ensure that pairings map to the expected field, i.e. not a subfield of the
targeted field (chapter 4).
The next stage, is to consider the two main requirements of cryptography, that are
the efficiency of the computation of the pairings (chapter 5) and their security (chapter
6). This permits the construction of a new identity based encryption scheme by taking
advantage of the bilinear property of the pairings (chapter 7), which in turn leads to
the more general question of knowing how to efficiently hash identities to points on a
curve (chapter 8).
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2Mathematics and pairings
If I didn’t understand anything to mathematics I would be
ashame to say it; letting others know that you are an idiot is not
the best way to present yourself.
B. Vian
Although pairings can be viewed from a simple angle as basic bilinear maps, a lot
more is involved when one wants to present them from a more mathematical perspective,
implying a good understanding of the underlying structures. Therefore, through this
chapter we will present some important results, on the cross roads of number theory,
algebra and algebraic geometry, always keeping in mind our initial target, pairings.
2.1 Rings and ideals
One of the main goal of mathematics is to classify objects which exhibit common
properties. When a common property is found among a few objects they form a set
called a class. However looking only at sets of objects does not allow for a satisfying
classification as for example the set of all sets cannot be defined. . . This leads to the
more general definition of category, giving rise to the notion of morphism or map.
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2.1 Rings and ideals
Together with some maps, sets can take special algebraic structures. For example,
K = (Q,+, .) defines a field with integer ring OK = (Z,+, .). This ring has the
property of being a unique factorization domain. However, when looking at number
fields, extensions of Q, this property is often lost, as for instance in the case of K =
Q(
√−5) and OK = Z+Z
√−5 where 21 can de factorised into prime factors using the
two following decompositions:
21 = 7.3
21 = (1 + 2
√−5)(1− 2√−5).
To overcome this failure, Kummer had the idea of finding a way to embed the
integers of K into a “larger domain” made of “ideal numbers” which would factorise
into primes. Following the preceding example, and using pi to denote those “ideal
numbers”, would lead to:
7 = p1p2, 3 = p3p4, (1 + 2
√−5) = p1p3, (1− 2
√−5) = p2p4.
And then the unique factorisation appears again as 21 = (p1p2)(p3p4) = (p1p3)(p2p4).
Later on, Dedekind [36] extended this idea by re-introducing the ideals in a way
that allowed him to define the division of a by b as the inclusion on b in the ideal
generated by a. Hence using this abstraction it was possible to reintroduce a unique
factorisation on the ring of integers of a number field. In fact this gave rise to the
notion of ideal factorisation. A ring such that every nonzero proper ideal factors into
a unique product of primes ideals is called a Dedekind domain. The following theorem
gives more details on the factorisation of ideals over such rings.
Theorem 2.1.1. ([116]) Let R be a Dedekind domain with quotient field K. Let L
be a finite extension of degree n of K and B the integral closure of R in L. Then B is
9
2.1 Rings and ideals
again a Dedekind domain and every non-zero prime ideal p of the ring R decomposes
in B in a unique way into a product of prime ideals:
pB =
∏
i
p
epi
i
The pi are precisely those prime ideals P of B such that p = P
⋂
R. epi is called the
ramification index in pi and the degree of the field extension fi = [B/pi : B/p] is called
the inertia degree of pi over p.
In the case of L being a separable extension,
∑
i
epifpi = n.
Example 2.1.2. ([103]) We want to study the ramification points in the following
case: let R = R[X], K = R(X), L = K[Y ]/〈Y 2 −X〉.
First by remarking that R[X] is principal, as R is a field, we see that all the prime
ideals of R are either defined by polynomials of degree 1, or irreducible polynomials of
degree 2 with discriminant less than zero. Thus 4 different cases occur:
1. p = (X − λ), λ ∈ R∗+. In this case Y 2 − λ = (Y −√λ)(Y +√λ), and then both
(Y −√λ) and (Y +√λ) have ramification index and inertia degree equal to 1.
2. p = (X − λ), λ ∈ R∗−. As p cannot be factorised, so it has ramification index
equal to 1 and inertia degree equal to 2.
3. p = (X2 + aX + b), a, b ∈ R, with discriminant less than zero. By rewriting p =
(X− z)(X− z) = (Y 2− z)(Y 2− z), we get 4 complex points, √z,√z,−√z,−√z,
considered as only 2 real points, yielding, for each point, ramification index 1 and
inertia degree 1.
4. p = (Y 2). In this case the ramification index is 2 and the inertia degree is 1.
We note that, as L is a separable extension of degree 2, in each case there is
∑
i
epifpi =
2.
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2.1 Rings and ideals
Ramification and algebraic structures can also be looked at from a geometrical
perspective, by seeing numbers as functions over a topological space. To do so, we
define the spectrum of a ring R, as X = Spec(R), to be the set of all maximal ideals
p in R, and we consider the sets V (b) = {p/p ⊇ b}, for b an ideal, to be closed.
X becomes a topological space, endowed with Zariski topology [37]. It can be made
slightly more general by extending the set of close sets to all prime ideals, not only the
maximal ones, and adding a generic point (0), which closure is the whole space X.
Example 2.1.3. ([103]) Looking at example 2.1.2 from a geometrical perspective, the
question is to know how the points of the curve Y 2 = X ramify over the R = R[X].
Using Zariski topology, the prime ideals of R are the closed points of Spec(R), and, as
such, are precisely the points defined by the 4 different types of ideals listed above. In
figure 2.1, the line represents A, and the curve has equation Y 2 = X. It becomes clear
that the fibers of the points in R, that is the spectrum of an algebra of dimension 2
over R, consist of 2 points, with residue field R, when λ > 0 and one point with residue
field C if λ < 0. When the fiber has only one point, i.e. λ = 0 here, the map Y 2 −X
is said to be ramified, and has ramification index equals 2. The special case of ideals
generated by an irreducible polynomial of degree 2 leads to 2 complex points z and z
considered as a unique real point (z, z), with residue field C.
Although Dedekind domains have a really nice structure, it may happen that the
rings we consider are not integrally closed and as such cannot be Dedekind domains
but only noetherian. When such rings have Krull dimension less or equal to 1, i.e.
such that the length of the longest, strictly increasing, chain of prime ideals of R is not
larger than 1, it is still possible to overcome the situation using the following result.
Theorem 2.1.4 (Krull-Akizuki [100, chapter 1, proposition 12.8]). Let R be
a noetherian integral domain of Krull dimension less or equal to 1, K its fraction field
and L an extension of finite degree. Then, every ring B such that R ⊂ B ⊂ L is
11
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z
z
Oλ
Figure 2.1: Geometrical interpretation of example 2.1.2.
noetherian of dimension less or equal than 1.
By applying this theorem to K = L, we see that the integral closure of R is a
Dedekind domain. This means that given a noetherian integral domain it is possible to
benefit from the structure of a Dedekind domain by taking its integral closure. From a
geometrical point of view it means that given a singular curve it can be rendered smooth
by looking at its integral closure. This process is called resolution of singularities.
Until now we have only given a rough presentation of the links between algebra and
geometry, so we will now have a proper look at what is a curve, how it is defined and
how to classify them. Table 2.1 from [103] gives a correspondence between the most
common terms of algebra and algebraic geometry.
12
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Algebra Algebraic geometry
Ring Affine scheme
R Spec(R)
Algebra over K Affine scheme over K
Finite algebra over K Algebraic variety over K
Noetherian over K and reduced Reduced algebraic variety over K
Prime ideal p Point P
Localisation in p Neighborhood of P
A unique minimal prime ideal Irreducible
Integral Reduced and irreducible
Localisation in each prime ideal Normal
is integrally closed
Integrally closed Reduced, irreducible and normal
Krull dimension 1 Algebraic variety of dimension 1
Table 2.1: Correspondence table between algebra and algebraic geometry
2.2 Varieties and curves
The main idea to link algebra and geometry is to find a one-to-one correspondences
between algebraic and geometrical structures. To do so, we start by defining an alge-
braic set, V (S), of a given finitely generated set S ⊂ K[x1, . . . , xn], as V (S) = {x/∀f ∈
S, f(x) = 0}. In the special case where V (S) cannot be written as a union of two
proper algebraic subsets it is called an algebraic variety [44].
Algebraic varieties are of major importance as they provide a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the prime ideals of a ring R and the irreducible closed elements of
Spec(R), endowed with Zariski topology, by associating V (p) to a prime ideal p.
When the algebraic set is generated by homogeneous polynomials, the variety is
said to be projective and affine otherwise. The projective closure W of an affine variety
V is defined by the homogenisation of each polynomial generating the corresponding
algebraic set. W − V defines a set of points called points at the infinity [127]. From a
practical point of view, the points at infinity are obtained by setting the homogenisation
variable to 0 and solving the resulting system.
The counterpart of the Krull dimension of an algebraic variety V , simply called
13
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dimension of V , is given by the smallest m such that K(V ) is an algebraic extension of
K[X1 . . . Xm]. If I(V ) denotes the prime ideal generated by the polynomials vanishing
on V , then K[X1 . . . Xn]/I(V ) is an integral domain of Krull dimension equal to the
dimension of the algebraic variety V . Hence, given an algebraic varieties V , I(V ) is
noetherian and the Krull-Akizuki theorem (2.1.4) can be applied to the special case
of algebraic varieties of dimension 1. Such objects, called curves, give a geometrical
representation of one-dimensional noetherian domain.
N
C
Figure 2.2: One-dimensional noetherian integral domain.
A curve can be either singular, if there exists a point where all the partial derivative
vanish, or smooth, if no such point exists. Figure 2.2 gives a geometrical representation
of a one-dimensional noetherian domain, with two singular points, a node N and a cusp
C. Following the Krull-Akizuki theorem (2.1.4), those singularities on the curve can
be resolved by taking the integral closure of the corresponding ring. Such a process is
called normalisation.
In order to have a closer examination of curves, we need to consider further refine-
ments to the theory already presented. As we saw previously, in the general case of R
being a one-dimensional noetherian domain over a field K, the prime ideal decomposi-
tion is not unique, implying that the fractional ideals do not form a group any more.
However, restricting our attention to the invertible ideals of R, i.e. the fractional ideals
a for which there exists b such that ab = R, leads to a new group structure. And
then, the quotient group of the invertible ideals of R by its fractional principal ideals
14
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can be defined. Such group is called the Picard group of the ring R and is denoted
Pic(R) [100, chapter 1, definition 12.5]. The side effect of this approach is that the
information conveyed by the non-invertible ideals is lost. Another solution is then to
reintroduce the group law using more abstract and artificial objects, called divisors.
The general idea used here, is to construct a group law from a simple collection of
objects having no special structure on them.
This formal group, called the divisor group of R, is defined as the direct sum of Zp
for all the prime ideals p of R. A divisor is an element of the divisor group of R, noted
Div(R). For f ∈ Div(R) it is written as a formal sum div(f) =
∑
p
npp. The degree of
this divisor is given by Deg(div(f)) =
∑
p
np. In order to mirror the construction of the
Picard group, we define a principal divisor, for each element of K, as the counterpart
of the principal ideal in the former case. Then, quotienting the divisor group of R by
its subgroup of principal divisors, leads to a new group called divisor class group [100,
chapter 1, definition 12.13].
In fact, when R is a Dedekind domain over K, the Picard group and the divisor
class group are isomorphic and as such, can be identified. It is also interesting to note
that, in this case, they are equal to the ideal class group [100, chapter 1, proposition
12.14], which gives a measure of how far R is from being a principal domain. The
cardinality of the group is called the class number of K.
The divisor theory can be transposed to curves by taking the spectrum of R en-
dowed with Zariski topology. As explained above, if R is a Dedekind domain, then the
corresponding curve C is smooth. Looking at the quotient of the divisors of degree 0
by the principal divisors, defines a subgroup of the Picard group, noted Pic0(C) and
called the Jacobian of C. From a topological point of view this group is a complete,
connected group variety, i.e. an abelian variety [95, chapter 1]. The dimension of the
Jacobian of C, as a variety, is given by the genus of the curve C.
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Theorem 2.2.1 (Riemann-Roch [127, chapter II, §5]). Let C be a smooth curve
and c a canonical divisor on C [127, chapter II, §4]. There exists g ∈ N such that for
every divisor D, l(D)− l(c−D) = Deg(D)− g + 1, where l(d) is the dimension of the
vector space L(D)
⋃{0} = {f ∈ C(K) / div(f) + D = 0}⋃{0}. g is called the genus
of C.
The genus of a curve is an important invariant which permits the classification of
curves. In the special case where C is a smooth plane projective curve of degree n, i.e. a
projective curve that can be embedded in the projective plane P2, its genus is given by
g(C) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)
2
. In particular it means that projective plane curves of certain
degree do not exist, for instance no such curve can have degree 2. The classification can
be improved by defining isogeny classes. Two abelian varieties are said to be isogenous
if there is a surjective morphism with finite kernel, called an isogeny, between them.
Any abelian variety which is not isogenous to a product of lower-dimensional abelian
varieties is said to be simple, and in the case where it is isogenous to the power of a
simple abelian variety it is called ordinary.
By applying the above equality in the case of C being a smooth projective and
plane curve of genus 0, we see that C has either degree 1, i.e. C is a copy of P1, or
degree 2, i.e. C is a conic in P2.
As curves of genus 1 are of more interest here, let C be a smooth projective curve
of genus 1 with a rational point at infinity O. For D ∈ Div(C) and f ∈ L(D),
0 = Deg(div(f)) ≥ Deg(−D) = −Deg(D), which implies Deg(D) ≥ 0.
Applying the Riemann-Roch theorem (2.2.1) to D = c, yields Deg(c) = 2g − 2.
Thus, L(c−D) = ∅ and l(c−D) = 0. But as C is a genus 1 curve l(D) = Deg(D).
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Considering, D = Dn = n(O), and Ln = L(n(O)), for n ∈ N, yields
L1 = K,
L2 = K⊕Kx,
L3 = K⊕Kx⊕Ky,
L4 = K⊕Kx⊕Ky ⊕Kx2,
L5 = K⊕Kx⊕Ky ⊕Kx2 ⊕Kxy,
L6 ) VectK{1, x, x2, x3, y, xy, y2}
where x and y are two functions with only one pole of order 2 in O and one pole of
order 3 in O respectively. As L6 is of dimension 6 but contains seven elements, it leads
to the following equation, for some ai ∈ K:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.2.1)
Hence, genus one curves can be defined by equation 2.2.1, named the Weierstrass
equation. In fact, the curves it defines are not necessarily smooth, however the extra
condition on the discriminant ∆ of the equation not being zero leads to a proper
definition of the class of smooth projective curve of genus 1, whose objects are called
elliptic curves (figure 2.3).
A case of interest for elliptic curves is when an isogeny class is defined by an iso-
morphism over an algebraic closure K. In fact, if a curve E/K and a curve E′/K are
isomorphic over K, then E′ is said to be a twist of E. For a curve E defined by equation
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2.2.1, the following variables can be defined [127, chapter III, §1]:
b2 = a
2
1 − 4a2 c4 = b22 − 24b4
b4 = a1a3 + 2a4 c6 = −b32 + 36b2b4 − 216b6
b6 = a
2
3 + 4a6 ∆ = −b22b8 + 9b2b4b6 − 8b34 − 27b26
b8 = a
2
1a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a23 + 4a2a6 − a24 j = c
3
4
∆
While ∆ 6= 0, the discriminant of the curve, depends on each curve, j is a constant
for all the curves inside an isomorphism class, and as such is called the j-invariant.
Figure 2.3: Elliptic curve of equation y2 = x3 − 2x+ 1.
One of the most important properties of smooth genus 1 curves is that they are the
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only curves which are isomorphic to their Jacobian, and as such they inherit its group
law. To describe it geometrically we start by remarking that homogenising equation
2.2.1 leads to only one point at infinity O = [0 : 1 : 0]. Then, we state the following
important result.
Theorem 2.2.2 (Bezout[44, chapter 5, section 5.3]). Let C1 and C2 be two plane
projective curves over an algebraically closed field K, such that they are defined by
different irreducible polynomials. The total number of intersection points of C1 and
C2, counted with their multiplicity, is given by the product of their degrees.
As a consequence the number of intersection points of an elliptic curve and a line is
three, allowing us to properly define the addition law. Let P and Q be two points on
E, then the line connecting them will intersect E in a third point R. The same idea
can be used to define R′, the third intersection point of E and the line connection R
and O. R′ is defined as being P +Q (figure 2.4).
Considering the Weirstrass equation 2.2.1 for an elliptic curve E over a field K,
it is possible to state an analytic version of the sum of two points, P = (xP , yP ) and
Q = (xQ, yQ), by studying the points of intersection of the two lines with the curve.
The first thing to remark is that the line connecting O and P intersects E in the point
−P = (xP ,−(yP + a1xP + a3)). This means that, the line connecting P and Q will
touch E in R = −(P +Q) and then applying the formula will lead to R′ = P +Q. Two
cases may arise depending whether or not P has intersection multiplicity 2. If P 6= Q,
then define
λ =
yQ − yP
xQ − xP , µ =
yPxQ − yQxP
xQ − xP ,
and if P = Q, let
λ =
3x2P + 2a2xP + a4 − a1yP
2yP + a1xP + a3
, µ =
−x3P + a4xP + 2a6 − a3yP
2yP + a1xP + a3
.
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Thus the line intersecting E in P and Q has equation y = λx+ µ, which yields
P +Q = (λ2 + a1λ− a2 − xP − xQ,−(λ+ a1)xP+Q − µ− a3).
-(P+Q)
P+Q
P
Q
x
y
Figure 2.4: Geometrical representation of elliptic curve addition law.
Although, we defined elliptic curves from an abstract point of view as abelian vari-
eties of dimension 1, it is possible to link this to their historical definition. Everything
started during the 18th century when the question of the arc length of an ellipse was
raised. This led to the study of integrals involving the square root of polynomials of
degree 3 or 4. It was quickly discovered that such integrals cannot be expressed using
familiar functions, which were named elliptic integrals.
Abel, then, had the idea of studying the inverse of these elliptic integrals , which
are now known as elliptic functions. It turned out that such functions are doubly
periodic, i.e. given an elliptic function f(x) ∃ ω1, ω2 ∈ C such that ω1ω2 ∈ R and
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f(x+ω1) = f(x+ω2) = f(x). This means that f(x) is isomorphic to the lattice Λ ⊂ C
generated by ω1, ω2. Then, considering C, the curve defined by f , and Ω(C), the space
of functions which are differentiable at every point in C, Hom(Ω(C), C)/Λ is, in fact,
the Jacobian of C [60].
Although higher genus curves are of great interest for number theory and solving
diophantine equations, we will only define an abelian surface as being a genus 2 abelian
variety, and instead will focus on maps from the Jacobian of a curve to its base field.
2.3 Pairings
Let J be the Jacobian variety of dimension g of a curve C over a field K. The group of
K-rational points of J is denoted by J(K), and then the r-torsion subgroup of J(K),
J(K)[r], containing the elements of order r, for r coprime to the characteristic of K,
is isomorphic to (Z/rZ)2g [68]. We define µr, as its counterpart over K, i.e. the set of
the rth-roots of unity. Given a divisor D on J(K), r∗JD is linearly equivalent to rD,
with rJ the following isogeny over J(K): x 7→ rx, and r∗J its dual [95, chapter I, section
8]. As rD is in J(K) it is a degree zero divisor and as such there exists two functions
(f1) = rD and (f2) = r
∗
JD. The object of interest here is div(f1 ◦ rJ).
div(f1 ◦ rJ) = r∗J(div(f1)) = r∗J(rD) = r(r∗JD) = r(div(f2)) = div(f r2 )
This equality means that
f r2
f1 ◦ rJ = c for c some constant function. Then for
P ∈ J(K)[r] and x ∈ J(K)
f2(x+ P )
r = c.f1 ◦ rJ(x+ P ) = c.f1(rx+ rP ) = c.f1(rx) = f2(x)r
Therefore,
(
f2(x)
f2(x+ P )
)r
= 1. Hence, for Q ∈ J(K)[r] having divisor D we can
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define the following map:
er : J(K)[r] × J(K)[r] → µr
(P , Q) 7→ f2(Q)f2(Q+P )
As expected, the map er, called the Weil pairing, maps two points on the Jacobian
of C to a point on its base field. The Weil pairing defined from two group G1 and G2
into a group GT has the following important properties:
Proposition 2.3.1 ([95, chapter 1, section 13]). The Weil pairing is
• non-degenerated:
– ∀P ∈ G1, P 6= 0 ∃Q ∈ G2 such that er(P,Q) 6= 1
– ∀Q ∈ G2, Q 6= 0 ∃P ∈ G1 such that er(P,Q) 6= 1
• bilinear: ∀P, P ′ ∈ G1 and ∀Q,Q′ ∈ G2
e(P + P ′, Q) = e(P,Q)e(P ′, Q) and e(P,Q+Q′) = e(P,Q)e(P,Q′)
• Galois-invariant: ∀σ ∈ Gal(K/K) er(σ(P ), σ(Q)) = σ(er(P,Q))
Given an isogeny φ, er(φ(a1), a2) = er(a1, φ
∗(a2)).
An other important pairing is the Tate pairing. In the scope of an elliptic curve E,
it is defined as follows:
er : E(K)[r] × E(K)/rE(K) → K∗/(K∗)r
(P , Q) 7→ f(D)
where f is a function whose divisor is equivalent to r(P )− r(O), and D is a degree
0 divisor equivalent to (Q)− (O) and has support disjoint from that of f .
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The pairing er maps a pair of points on the elliptic curve to an equivalence class
of K∗/(K∗)r. However by pointing out the existence of an isomorphism between the
elements of order r in K and K∗/(K∗)r, it becomes possible to compute f(D) as f(Q).
In the simple case where K is algebraically closed µr is a subset of K implying that
K∗/(K∗)r is isomorphic to µr. More generally, K∗/(K∗)r is isomorphic to µd where d
divides r.
The Tate pairing satisfies the following properties.
Proposition 2.3.2 ([46]). The Tate pairing is bilinear, non-degenerated and Galois
invariant.
Throughout the next chapter, we will take a closer look at pairings over finite fields,
answering the question as to which curves are of interest in this context and how to
compute a pairing in practice.
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The world let by its own follows inevitable laws.
H. Bergson
3.1 Pairings over finite fields
The definition of pairings given in the preceding chapter is valid for any abelian variety
J over any field K. However, in order for the pairing to exist, if one wants to restrict
oneself to a finite field K, the first thing to do is to ensure that K contains the rth
roots of unity. Given a finite field Fq, this is done by adjoining a primitive rth-root
of unity ζr to Fq and considering the extension Fq(ζr) of Fq. The dimension of this
extension is called the embedding degree of the abelian variety J/Fq. From a practical
point of view, the embedding degree of J/Fq with respect to r, is the smallest integer
k such that r|qk − 1. This means that r - qi − 1 for all integers 1 ≤ i < k. This remark
links embedding degree and cyclotomic polynomials.
Although cyclotomic polynomials and cyclotomic fields are of great interest in
number theory we will focus only on a few properties, referring the reader to [138]
for more details on the topic. In our case we define the k-th cyclotomic polynomial
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as the minimal polynomial of ζk, a primitive k-th root of unity in Q, and denote it
Φk(X) =
∏
gcd(k,j)=1
(X − ζjk). For all k the polynomial Φk(X) is defined over Z[X], and
has degree ϕ(k), where ϕ is Euler’s totient function. Another formulation of cylotomic
polynomials is recursively given as follows:
 X
k − 1 = ∏d|k Φd(X)
Φ1 = (X − 1)
Example 3.1.1. Examples of cyclotomic polynomials are listed below:
Φ2 = X + 1
Φ3 = X
2 +X + 1
Φ6 = X
2 −X + 1
Φ12 = X
4 −X2 + 1
For instance when k = 2 applying the above recursive definition yields:
X2 − 1 = Φ1(X) · Φ2(X)
Φ2 =
(X2−1)
(X−1)
= X + 1
For k = 6, Φ6 =
X6−1
Φ3Φ2Φ1
= X2 −X + 1.
The above remark, together with the following lemma [138, lemma 2.9] helps to view
the embedding degree from a new angle.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let k be an integer, and r a prime not dividing k, then r|Φk(q) is
equivalent to saying that k is the multiplicative order of q mod r.
Since the assertion “k is the smallest integer such that r|qk − 1” is equivalent to “k
is the multiplicative order of q mod r”, it follows that the definition of the embedding
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degree can be stated in terms of cyclotomic polynomials. The result contained in [42,
proposition 2.4] is fundamental to the understanding of pairings over finite fields:
Proposition 3.1.3. Let k be a positive integer, E/Fq a curve with hr points where r
is prime, and let t be the trace of E/Fq. If r - kq, then E has embedding degree k with
respect to r if and only if Φk(q) ≡ 0 mod r.
By looking at the definition of the embedding degree, clearly, taking r as a large
divisor of #J(Fq) ≈ qg [96] implies that most of the elements in Fr have large order, and
so will be the embedding degree k. This is a problem as it renders the computation of
the pairings too complex to be used in practice. This gives rise to the notion of pairing-
friendly abelian variety, i.e. an abelian variety appropriate for being used in the context
of pairings. When such varieties have genus 1 they are called pairing-friendly elliptic
curves.
One way to measure how efficient a pairing-friendly abelian variety is, is to define ρ,
the ratio of the size of J(Fq) to the size of the group of order r, onto which the pairing
maps:
ρ = g
log q
log r
For a pairing-friendly abelian variety to result in an efficient implementation it is ex-
pected to have a ρ-value close to 1.
Unless explicitly mentioned the abelian varieties now considered will be of genus 1,
i.e. elliptic curves.
3.2 Pairing-friendly elliptic curves
Let q = pm for p a prime and m a positive integer. Fq seen as an m-dimensional
vector space over Fp, allows the representation of any endomorphism f of Fq as a
matrix M . The sum of the eigenvalues of M is called the trace of the endomorphism
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f . When f is the Frobenius endomorphism, i.e. f(x) = pip(x) = x
p, x ∈ Fq, its trace t
is linked to the number of Fq-rational points on an elliptic curve E/Fq by the relation
#E(Fq) = q + 1 − t. As a function t satisfies the Hasse bound [127, Theorem V.1.1]:
|t| ≤ 2√q.
The definition given for a pairing-friendly abelian variety being quite vague, we
start by defining it more formal in the context of elliptic curves.
Definition 3.2.1. ([43, definition 2.3]) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. E
is said to be pairing-friendly if there is a prime r ≥ √q dividing #E(Fq) and the
embedding degree of E with respect to r is less than log2(r)/8.
With this definition, pairing-friendly elliptic curves are rare [86] and as such hard
to find. However, it is still possible to exhibit a few of them using some special con-
structions based on the so-called Complex Multiplication (CM) method [98].
The first elliptic curves to be recognised as pairing-friendly, do not require any
specific construction as they are the elliptic curves satisfying gcd(t, q) > 1. Such curves,
discovered by Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [91], are called supersingular elliptic
curves. Another way to define them is to say that they do not have any p-torsion
points.
More generally, any abelian variety of higher dimension that is isogenous to a prod-
uct of supersingular elliptic curves is called a supersingular abelian variety. In the case
of supersingular elliptic curves it was shown that they can have five possible embed-
ding degrees k, corresponding to five possible absolute values of the trace of Frobenius
t (table 3.1) [91].
Since using only supersingular curves is a bit restrictive, new methods have been
developed to construct ordinary pairing-friendly, elliptic curves. One of the first sug-
gested was by Cocks and Pinch [46]. Using their method, it is easy to generate pairing-
friendly elliptic curves of arbitrary embedding degree. However a major drawback is
their ρ-value, close to 2, leads to “slow” implementations.
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k t #E(Fq) p,m
1 ±2√q q ∓ 2√q + 1 any p, m even
2 0 q + 1 any p, any m
3 ±√q q ∓√q + 1 p ≡ 2 mod 3, m even
4 ±√2q q ∓√2q + 1 p = 2, m odd
6 ±√3q q ∓√3q + 1 p = 3, m odd
Table 3.1: Classification of supersingular elliptic curves.
Leaving those curves aside, few families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with ρ-
value close to 1 remain. They are constructed using the CM Method [15]. The idea
relies on the possibility to factor 4p− t2 into a square v2 multiplied by a small number
D, called the CM discriminant. Using the CM method with the parameters p and
n = p+1−t allows the constructions of curves with n points over Fp. In fact, all known
non-supersingular pairing-friendly elliptic curves are CM curves, which means that they
satisfy the CM equation Dv2 = 4p− t2 for some small discriminant D < 1014 [130]. Its
is interesting to note that the only reason to keep the discriminant D small is to render
the construction possible.
MNT curves: Miyaji, Nakabayashi and Takano [97], introduced the first ordinary
pairing-friendly elliptic curves. Their strategy consist in solving a generalised Pell
equation of the form X2 − SDV 2 = M for some small discriminants until the solution
provides suitable parameters to be used by the CM method. The major downside of
this construction relies on the fact that, given a discriminant D, it leads to very few
curves, even without any bound on the field size. Although they are rare, it happens
that they can be useful in practice and have ρ-value close to 1. Table 3.2 gives a
characterisation of a family of ordinary elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 3, 4
or 6, known as the MNT curves.
When k = 6, i.e. p = 4x2 + 1 and t = 1 ± 2x (table 3.2), and X is set to 6x ± 1 the
CM equation can be rewritten as the generalised Pell equation X2−3Dv2 = −8. Then
solving it, leads to the MNT family of elliptic curves with embedding degree 6 which
28
3.2 Pairing-friendly elliptic curves
k q = p t
3 12x2 − 1 −1± 6x
4 x2 + x+ 1 −x, x+ 1
6 4x2 + 1 1± 2x
Table 3.2: Classification of MNT curves (x ∈ Z).
can be described by the following three polynomials, t(x), r(x) and p(x) representing
the prime modulus p, the group order r and the trace t, respectively:
t(x) = x+ 1
r(x) = x2 − x+ 1
p(x) = x2 + 1.
Freeman curves: Similarly to MNT curves, Freeman curves [41] form a sparse
family. Since their discriminant must satisfy D ≡ 43 or 67 mod 120, it is usually very
large. If there exists D such that the Pell equation X − 15Dy2 = −20 has a solution,
then this yields a family of curves, having ρ-value 1 and embedding degree 10, defined
by the following polynomials:
t(x) = 10x2 + 5x+ 3
r(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 15x2 + 5x+ 1
p(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 25x2 + 10x+ 3.
BN curves: Barreto and Naehrig curves [9] are probably the most well known
pairing-friendly elliptic curves. While they also have ρ-value 1, BN curves, on the
contrary to the previously mentioned curves, are plentiful, easy to find and have a
constant discriminant D = 3. This family of curves having embedding degree k = 12
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can be defined using the following polynomials:
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1
p(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x+ 1.
BW curves: Brezing and Weng [19], gave some more general constructions of
pairing-friendly elliptic curves, making heavy use of cyclotomic fields. Although their
construction produces curves having ρ-value slightly larger than 1, they cover almost
all possible embedding degrees. The two following families feature a discriminant of
D = 3.
For k = 8, ρ = 5/4, the family is defined as follows:
t(x) = x5 − x+ 1
r(x) = x8 − x4 + 1
p(x) =
1
3
(x10 − 2x9 + x8 − x6 + 3x5 − x4 + x2 − 2x+ 1).
For k = 32, ρ = 17/16, and the curves are defined by the polynomials:
t(x) = x17 − x+ 1
r(x) = x32 − x16 + 1
p(x) =
1
3
(x34 − x33 + x32 − x18 + 2x17 − x16 + x2 − 2x+ 1).
KSS curves: The KSS construction [76] is quite similar to the one used by Brezing
and Weng as it only differs on how to define the chosen cyclotomic field. This new
approach allowed improvements on some ρ-values of BW curves. Embedding degrees
k = 8, 16, 32, 36 and 40 can be achieved, with a special mention for curves of embedding
degree 18 having ρ-value 4/3. In the case of embedding degree k = 8, ρ = 3/2 and
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D = 1,
t(x) =
1
15
(2x3 − 11x+ 15)
r(x) =
1
450
(x4 − 8x2 + 25)
p(x) =
1
180
(x6 + 2x5 − 3x4 + 8x3 − 15x2 − 82x+ 125).
For embedding degree k = 18, ρ = 4/3, and D = 3,
t(x) =
1
7
(x4 + 16x+ 7)
r(x) =
1
343
(x6 + 37x3 + 343)
p(x) =
1
21
(x8 + 5x7 + 7x6 + 37x5 + 188x4 + 259x3 + 343x2 + 1763x+ 2401).
In this case we note that t(x), r(x) and p(x) must evaluate as integers and so x ≡ 14
mod 42 [76].
Hence, two basic choices of pairing-friendly elliptic curves are available, the super-
singular curves over any finite field of characteristic 2 or 3, and ordinary pairing-friendly
elliptic curves over Fp. In the former case only curves with embedding degrees up to
k = 6, over fields of characteristic 3, are possible. Fortunately, ordinary pairing-friendly
elliptic curves also exist, allowing an unlimited choice of k. Given that, the construction
of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with any embedding degree becomes possible, mean-
ing long term viability of systems using them, as long as these curves remain efficient
enough.
It is also interesting to note that all elliptic curves over finite fields have a quadratic
twist, i.e. are isomorphic to a curve over Fq2 . However, under certain conditions [43,
section 7.3] it may happen that curves have higher order twist equal to 3, 4 or 6. In
fact only curves with CM discriminant D = 1, i.e. curves of the form y2 = x3 + ax,
have quartic twist, while the ones having a CM discriminant D = 3, that is the curves
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of equation y2 = x3 + b, can have cubic and sextic twists. Although the case of curves
over characteristic 2 or 3 is more complicated they still have the degree of their twists
dividing 6 [127].
In practice, when implementing pairings on ordinary pairing friendly curves, a pa-
rameter is taken on the curve defined over the base field Fp, while the other one is
picked on a twisted curve featuring a group of points of order r which are isomorphic
to a group of points on the curve defined over Fpk . This is very useful as the output
of the Tate pairing can then be taken as an element of Fqk/d if the degree d of the
twist divides the embedding degree k. This idea, known as “compression technique” as
dlog2 de bits of information are dropped, was first introduced by Scott and Barreto [122]
in the case of a quadratic twist before being extended to sextic twists [9].
Another important efficiency improvement in the computation of a pairing resulting
from the use of the twist is that the second parameter can be taken in E′(Fpk/d) instead
of E(Fpk). This clearly allows more efficient implementations. For example noting that
BN curves have a CM discriminant D = 3 and an embedding degree k = 12 implies
that they admit a sextic twist. Hence, the second parameter can be picked in E′(Fp2)
instead of E(Fp12), implying a lower computational cost.
For a more complete study of pairing-friendly elliptic curves the reader should refer
to Freeman, Scott and Teske taxonomy [43].
3.3 Computing pairings
Once the definition of a pairing has been given and some pairing-friendly elliptic curves
have been presented, the next stage clearly is to explain how to compute a pairing in
practice. Although the Weil and Tate pairings were introduced we will focus only on
the latter, the former being usually less efficiently implementable.
From the definition of the Tate pairing given at the end of chapter 2, it appears
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that the main question is how to find a function f having a divisor equivalent to
r(P )− r(O). In fact, Miller’s idea [93] to compute the Weil pairing, can be adapted to
the computation of the Tate pairing. The key point is the evaluation of f(R) for every
R in the support of D. Following Miller one can randomly pick R on the curve and for
all i ≤ r define fi such that div(fi) = i(P +R)− i(R)− ([i]P ) + (O). By construction,
when i = r, rP = O, and fr = f .
For any 2 points A and B, denote by lA,B the line passing through A and B, and
vA the vertical line connecting A to O. Remarking the following two equalities,
div(li1P,i2P ) = ([i1]P ) + ([i2]P ) + (−[i1 + i2]P )− 3(O)
div(v[i1+i2]P ) = ([i1 + i2]P ) + (−[i1 + i2]P )− 2(O)
leads to
div(fi1+i2) = div(fi1) + div(fi2) + div(li1P,i2P )− div(v[i1+i2]P ).
Hence, 
fi1+i2 =
fi1fi2 l[i1]P,[i2]P
v[i1+i2]P
,
f0 = 1,
f1 =
lP,R
vP+R
defines a recursive sequence of length r + 1, whose last element is f . This allows us to
derive Miller’s algorithm for Tate pairing as described in algorithm 3.1.
As explained above, the Miller loop computes the function f . However an extra
stage is required in order to ensure the uniqueness of the result. Since the output of
the loop does not necessarily have order r, an extra exponentiation of f to the power
(qk−1)/r must be performed. This results in log(r) squaring, H(r)−1 multiplications,
with H(r) the Hamming weight of r, i.e. the number of 1’s in the binary representation
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Algorithm 3.1 Miller’s algorithm for Tate pairing.
Input: P ∈ E(Fq)[r], Q ∈ E(Fq).
Output: e(P,Q).
1: T ← P
2: f ← 1
3: for i← blog(r)− 1c to 0 do
4: f ← f
2lT,T (Q)
v2T (Q)
5: T ← 2T
6: if ri = 1 then
7: f ← f lT,P (Q)vT+P (Q)
8: T ← T + P
9: end if
10: end for
11: f ← f (qk−1)/r
12: return f
of r, and an exponentiation. As such, Miller’s algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm.
The version of Miller’s algorithm given here (algorithm 3.1) is basic and some more
sophisticated ones can be derived, [120, 66, 32]. Moreover, when dealing with an imple-
mentation of pairings, one should keep in mind Galbraith’s list of seven common strate-
gies that can be used in order to improve the efficiency of pairing computations [46,
chapter IX].
1. Pick an r having small hamming weight.
2. As much as possible work in Fq instead of Fqk .
3. Use efficient arithmetic over Fq and Fqk .
4. Avoid expensive calculation like division, use more squaring and less multiplica-
tions.
5. Find ways to improve the efficiency of the final exponentiation.
6. Note that whenever k > 1 and n is prime, n does not divide q − 1 implying that
the (qk − 1)/nth power of all elements of F∗q is 1. Therefore all terms in the
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algorithm leading to an element of F∗q can be ignored.
7. If P ∈ E(Fq)[r] and Q = (X,Y ) ∈ E(Fqk) with X ∈ Fqk/2 , then the denominators
computation in the Miller loop can be discarded [10].
It is interesting to note that faster variants of the Tate pairing, like ate or R-ate
pairings, exist. Although we do not consider their specifics, as it is not the main topic
of interest here, the reader can refer to [39, 82], for more details on the subject. Instead,
we will present new results on the field into which the pairing maps.
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4Pairings and the minimal
embedding field
I revolt, therefore we are.
A. Camus
Following the definition of pairings (chapter 2) and its restriction to the case of
a finite field Fq (chapter 3), we see that the set of the rth roots of unity µr ⊂ Fq
must be contained in an extension field Fqk , where k is the embedding degree of the
pairing-friendly abelian variety used. In fact, Rubin and Silverberg [112] and Hitt [69]
observed that when the field size q is not prime, the rth roots of unity may be contained
in a proper subfield F ⊂ Fqk . This observation leads to the definition of the minimal
embedding field of a pairing-friendly abelian variety J over Fq, with respect to r, as the
smallest field F ⊂ Fqk containing µr. An obvious question is then to know when the
minimal embedding field is not a proper subfield of Fqk .
Rubin and Silverberg [113] have given an answer to this question in the case where
J is supersingular by demonstrating a lower bound on r that guarantees that the
minimal embedding field is Fqk . Their bound depends on q and on the dimension g of
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the supersingular abelian variety, but does not depend on k. So, in order to generalise
their result we want to give explicit conditions on q, r, and k that guarantees that the
minimal embedding field of an abelian variety J/Fq, supersingular or not, is in fact Fqk .
4.1 Framework
For J an abelian variety over Fq with embedding degree k, we know that Fqk is the
smallest extension of Fq containing the rth roots of unity. Then, the Weil pairing [127,
§III.8] and [96, §16] and the Tate pairing [35] take values in a subgroup and a quotient
group of F∗
qk
, respectively. The key observation made by Rubin and Silverberg [112]
and Hitt [69] is that these pairings actually take values in the minimal embedding field
and that this field may be a proper subfield of Fqk . This observation, found in different
forms in each paper, is expressed by Hitt as follows:
Lemma 4.1.1 ([69, Lemma 1]). Let q = pm for some prime p and positive integer
m, let r 6= p be a prime, and let k be the smallest integer such that r divides qk − 1.
Then
k =
ordr(p)
gcd(ordr(p),m)
,
where ordr(p) is the order of p in (Z/rZ)∗.
The main consequence of the result is that the minimal embedding field of an abelian
variety J/Fq is Fqk′ , where k
′ = ordr(p)/m ∈ Q, and as such, is not necessarily Fqk
(figure 4.1).
Indeed, Hitt gives examples of abelian varieties where k/k′ = m, which is the largest
possible ratio for these parameters [69, §4]. One important thing to note is that when
the abelian variety is defined over a prime field, i.e. m = 1, Hitt’s lemma has no
effect, as the minimal embedding field is always Fqk = Fpk . Thus, only the case of
pairing-friendly abelian varieties over extension fields needs to be considered.
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Fp
Fq
Fqk
Fqk′m
k
≥ 1
ordr(p)
Figure 4.1: Field diagram showing the minimal embedding field Fqk′ .
In the case where J/Fq is supersingular and elementary, with embedding degree k,
and r - 2k, Rubin and Silverberg defined the exponent cJ as the smallest half-integer
such that r divides qcJ−1. Then, their theorem, phrased in terms of cJ , gives conditions
on q, r, and k for the minimal embedding field to be Fqk .
Theorem 4.1.2 ([112, Theorem 7] and [113, Theorem 6.3]). Suppose J is an
elementary supersingular abelian variety of dimension g over Fq, q = pm, r 6= p is a
prime divisor of #J(Fq), and s is the multiplicative order of p mod r. Let FJ(x) ∈ Z[x]
be the characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius for J , and let f be the unique integer
such that FJ(x)
1/f is irreducible in Z[x]. If q is a square, assume r > (1 + p)mg/2f . If q
is not a square, assume r > (1 +
√
p)2mg/3f and r > 7. Then ps = qcJ,q , so FqcJ,q is the
smallest extension of Fp whose multiplicative group has a subgroup of order r.
In order to improve the bounds, and extend their validity to all abelian varieties, we
start by linking the minimal embedding field to cyclotomic polynomials, in the same
way as done to relate embedding degree and cyclotomic polynomials.
Lemma 4.1.3. Let q = pm be a prime power, and J/Fq be an abelian variety. Let
r 6= p be a prime dividing #J(Fq), and let k, s be integers not divisible by r. Then
1. J has embedding degree k with respect to r if and only if r | Φk(q).
2. The minimal embedding field of J with respect to r is Fps if and only if r | Φs(p).
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Proof. The first statement appears e.g. as [43, Proposition 2.4]; we observe that the
same proof applies to the second statement. uunionsq
Lemma 4.1.3 allows us to rephrase the question of knowing when the minimal
embedding field is not a proper subfield of Fqk into examining whether or not a given
r dividing Φk(p
m) does also divide Φkm(p). To answer the question in this form some
extra properties of cyclotomic polynomials are required.
Fact 4.1.4. Let Φk(x) denote the kth cyclotomic polynomial. Then
1. xk − 1 =
∏
d|k
Φd(x).
2. The degree of Φk(x) is ϕ(k) := #{e ∈ Z : 1 ≤ e ≤ k and gcd(e, k) = 1}.
3. If ` is a prime not dividing k, then Φk(x
`) = Φk`(x)Φk(x).
4. If ` is a prime dividing k, then Φk(x
`) = Φk`(x).
These properties either appear, or can be easily derived from the discussion of [81,
§VI.3], allowing us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1.5. If k and m are coprime, then
Φk(x
m) =
∏
d|m
Φkd(x). (4.1.1)
Proof. We first compare the degrees of the polynomials on each side of (4.1.1). Clearly
the left hand side has degree mϕ(k). Now for any coprime numbers x and y we have
ϕ(xy) = ϕ(x)ϕ(y). Since (k,m) = 1 by assumption it is also true that (k, d) = 1 for
all d | m. It follows that the degree of the right hand side of (4.1.1) is ϕ(k)∑d|m ϕ(d),
which by Fact 4.1.4 (1) and (2) is equal to mϕ(k).
We next compare the roots of the two polynomials. First, we observe that by Fact
4.1.4 (1) the right hand side divides xkm − 1 and thus has only simple roots. Now
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suppose ζ is a root of Φkd(x) for some d | m. Since ζ is a primitive kdth root of unity,
ζd is a primitive kth root of unity. Write m = de. Since gcd(k, e) = 1, it follows that
(ζd)e = ζm is also a primitive kth root of unity, so ζ is also a root of Φk(x
m).
Since the two polynomials in (4.1.1) are both monic and have the same degree, and
furthermore all roots of the right hand side are simple and are also roots of the left
hand side, we conclude that the two polynomials are equal. uunionsq
We will now present the main result of this chapter which, although stated in terms
of cylotomic polynomials, will allow us to give an answer to our main question.
Theorem 4.1.6. Let k be a positive integer, pm a prime power, and r a prime. Write
m = αβ, where every prime dividing α also divides k and gcd(k, β) = 1. (This factor-
ization is unique.) Denote by e the smallest prime factor of β. Suppose r | Φk(pm) and
that one of the following holds:
1. m = α (and β = 1);
2. β is prime and r > Φkα(p);
3. r > pkm/e; or
4. 4 | m or 2 | k, and r > pkm/2e + 1.
Then r | Φkm(p).
Proof. We first note that Fact 4.1.4 (4) implies
Φk(p
m) = Φkα(p
β). (4.1.2)
Since kα and β are coprime, Lemma 4.1.5 implies that Φk(p
m) has Φkm(p) as a factor.
Our strategy in each case is to show that the remaining factors of Φk(p
m) are all smaller
than r. Since r is prime, it then follows that if r divides Φk(p
m) then r divides Φkm(p).
We now consider each case separately:
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1. Since m = α it follows immediately that Φk(p
m) = Φkm(p).
2. Since β is a prime not dividing kα, equation (4.1.2) and fact 4.1.4 (3) imply that
Φk(p
m) = Φkαβ(p)Φkα(p) = Φkm(p)Φkα(p).
Since r > Φkα(p), it follows that r | Φkm(p).
3. By equation (4.1.2) and Lemma 4.1.5 we have
Φk(p
m) =
∏
d|β
Φkdα(p) =
∏
d|β
Φkm/d(p). (4.1.3)
By assumption we have r > pkm/d for all d | β except for d = 1, and by Fact 4.1.4
(1) we have pkm/d > Φkm/d(p) for all such d. It follows that r | Φkm(p).
4. Given the factorization of Φk(p
m) as in (4.1.3), the same analysis as in Case 3
shows that r > Φkm/d(p) for all d | β with d ≥ 2e. Since e is the smallest
prime dividing β, if d | β and 1 < d < 2e then d is prime, so it suffices to show
that r > Φkm/d(p) for all primes d dividing β. Let d be such a prime. The
assumption 4 | m or 2 | k then implies that km/d is even. In this case we have
xkm/d − 1 = (xkm/2d + 1)(xkm/2d − 1), and Φkm/d(x) must divide the first factor
by Fact 4.1.4 (1). Since d ≥ e, if r > pkm/2e + 1 then r > Φkm/d(p). uunionsq
In order to link this result on cyclotomic polynomials to abelian varieties, we use
lemma 4.1.3, leading to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1.7. Let J be an abelian variety over Fq, where q = pm with p prime.
Let r 6= p be a prime dividing #J(Fq), and suppose J has embedding degree k with
respect to r. Assume that r - km. If q, k, and r satisfy any of the conditions (1)–(4)
of Theorem 4.1.6, then the minimal embedding field of J with respect to r is Fpkm.
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We note that if m is prime, usually r ≈ pmg, with g = dim J , and m k, then case
(2) of Theorem 4.1.6 applies. Another situation of interest is when p is small, p = 2 or
p = 3 are common choices, then the bound on r given by the theorem is very weak, i.e.
J will have minimal embedding field Fqk with respect to any r used in practice.
It is interesting to note that, although the way theorem 4.1.6 is stated should allow
its application to abelian varieties over finite fields that are not pairing-friendly, some
cases remain unanswered. For instance, if k  m and the dimension g is small then
none of the conditions of theorem 4.1.6 can be expected to hold: condition (1) is very
unlikely and conditions (2)–(4) would require r  qg, which is impossible.
Moreover we remark that, if k is odd andm is even then Φk(x
m) = Φk(x
m/2)Φ2k(x
m/2).
Since ϕ(k) = ϕ(2k) for odd k, these two factors have the same degree and the above
techniques cannot be used to show that r divides Φkm(p) and does not divide Φkm/2(p).
Applying theorem 4.1.6 recursively to each factor allows us to determine conditions on
q, k, and r guaranteeing that r divides one of the two expressions Φkm(p) and Φkm/2(p),
but some additional information is required to determine which one.
In the context of pairing-friendly curves, this situation rarely occurs as even em-
bedding degrees and prime values for m are preferred in practice. However, when this
situation arise it has to be solved on a case by case basis, as done in propositions 4.2.4
and 4.2.5 below.
4.2 Supersingular elliptic curves over extension fields
Supersingular elliptic curves, are the most well known pairing-friendly abelian varieties
defined over non-prime fields, and as such are often used. Usually, in order to optimize
implementation, when using a supersingular curve, the curve is chosen to have the
maximal embedding degree, that is, a supersingular curve over F2m with embedding
degree k = 4 or over F3m with embedding degree k = 6. Such curves mostly have
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near-prime order, i.e. their order can be written as a product of a large prime and a
small factor, and, as defined over field of small characteristic, benefit from some curve
arithmetic optimization. This makes them a really good choice for efficient pairing
implementations, especially because their minimal embedding field is Fqk as stated in
the two following propositions.
Proposition 4.2.1 (k = 4). Let q = 2m with m odd, and let E be a supersingular
elliptic curve over Fq that has embedding degree 4 with respect to a prime r - 2m. If
either
• ρ < 3
2
(
1− 1
log2 r
)
, or
• m is prime and r > 5,
then E has minimal embedding field Fq4.
Proof. If we write m = αβ as in Theorem 4.1.6, then the smallest prime dividing β
must be at least 3. Thus if r > q2/3 +1 then condition (4) of Theorem 4.1.6 is satisfied.
If m is prime and r > 5 = Φ4(2) then condition (2) of Theorem 4.1.6 is satisfied. In
both cases, by Corollary 4.1.7 E has minimal embedding field Fq4 . An easy calculation
shows that if ρ < 32(1− 1log2 r ) then r > q
2/3 + 1. uunionsq
Proposition 4.2.2 (k = 6). Let q = 3m with m odd, and let E be a supersingular
elliptic curve over Fq that has embedding degree 6 with respect to a prime r - 6m. If
either
• ρ < 5
3
(
1− 1
log2 r
)
, or
• m is prime and r > 7,
then E has minimal embedding field Fq6.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Proposition 4.2.1. uunionsq
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We remark that, in both of the above cases the exponent cJ defined by Rubin and
Silverberg is equal to k. Their result (Theorem 4.1.2) then implies that when k = 4,
the conclusion of proposition 4.2.1 holds whenever ρ < 3 log 2
2 log(1+
√
2)
≈ 1.18, and that
when k = 6, the conclusion of proposition 4.2.2 holds whenever ρ < 3 log 3
2 log(1+
√
3)
≈ 1.64.
Thus, in both cases our result is stronger, as it requires a weaker upper bound on ρ,
for sufficiently large r.
In some special cases one may wish to use supersingular elliptic curves with very
small embedding degrees for implemention. We thus continue our analysis by investi-
gating the cases 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. The case k = 2 is the most straightforward.
Proposition 4.2.3 (k = 2). Let q = pm, and let E be a supersingular elliptic curve
over Fq that has embedding degree 2 with respect to a prime r - 2m. If either
• ρ < 3
(
1− 1
log2 r
)
, or
• m is prime and r > p+ 1,
then E has minimal embedding field Fq2.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Proposition 4.2.1. uunionsq
Rubin and Silverberg’s result (theorem 4.1.2) says that the conclusion of Proposition
4.2.3 holds whenever ρ < 2−  when m is even and whenever ρ < 3−  when m is odd,
with → 0 as p→∞. Thus our result is stronger when m is even.
The cases k = 1 and k = 3 are more subtle, as it is not really possible to avoid the
minimal embedding field to be Fqk/2 even when r is very large. However, if the sign of
the trace is known, then theorem 4.1.6 can be applied to determine when the minimal
embedding field is Fqk or Fqk/2 .
Proposition 4.2.4 (k = 1). Let q = pm with m even, and let E be a supersingular
elliptic curve over Fq that has embedding degree 1 with respect to a prime r - m. If E
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has trace −2pm/2 and ρ < 6(1 − 1log2 r ), then E has minimal embedding field Fq. If E
has trace 2pm/2 and ρ < 4, then E has minimal embedding field Fq1/2.
Proof. Let m′ = m/2. Suppose E has trace −2pm′ . Then #E(Fq) = (pm′ + 1)2, so r
divides Φ2(p
m′). We now apply Theorem 4.1.6 with k = 2 and m = m′. If we write
m′ = αβ as in the theorem, then the smallest prime dividing the β of theorem 4.1.6
must be at least 3. Thus if r > pm
′/3 + 1 = q1/6 + 1 then condition (4) of the theorem
is satisfied, so by corollary 4.1.7 E has minimal embedding field Fp2m′ = Fq. An easy
calculation shows that if ρ < 6(1− 1log2 r ) then r > q
1/6 + 1.
Now suppose E has trace 2pm
′
. Then #E(Fq) = (pm
′−1)2, so r divides Φ1(pm′). We
now apply theorem 4.1.6 with k = 1 and m = m′. If r > pm′/2 = q1/4 (or equivalently,
if ρ < 4) then condition (3) of the theorem is satisfied, so by corollary 4.1.7 E has
minimal embedding field Fpm′ = Fq1/2 . uunionsq
When k = 1, Rubin and Silverberg’s exponent cJ is equal to 1 if E has negative
trace and 1/2 if E has positive trace. In both cases the integer f of theorem 4.1.2
is equal to 2. Thus theorem 4.1.2 says that the conclusion of proposition 4.2.4 holds
whenever ρ < 4− , with → 0 as p→∞. Our result is then stronger for the first case
as well as for small p.
In fact, proposition 4.2.4 demonstrates the fact that the minimal embedding field of
an elliptic curve E can be smaller than its field of definition. One can construct such a
curve as follows: Let p > 3 be prime, and let E/Fp be a supersingular elliptic curve over
Fp. If we define E′/Fp2 as a quadratic twist of E over Fp2 , then #E′(Fp2) = (p − 1)2,
and the minimal embedding field of E′ with respect to any r | p− 1 is Fp.
Finally, we consider the case of embedding degree k = 3. As with k = 1, the
minimal embedding field can be determined from the sign of the trace.
Proposition 4.2.5 (k = 3). Let q = pm with m even, and let E be a supersingular
elliptic curve over Fq that has embedding degree 3 with respect to a prime r - 3m. If E
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has trace pm/2 and ρ < 103 (1 − 1log2 r ), then E has minimal embedding field Fq3. If E
has trace −pm/2 and ρ < 4/3, then E has minimal embedding field Fq3/2.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Proposition 4.2.4. uunionsq
When k = 3, Rubin and Silverberg’s exponent cJ is equal to 3 if E has positive
trace and 3/2 if E has negative trace. Thus theorem 4.1.2 says that the conclusion
of proposition 4.2.5 holds whenever ρ < 2 − , with  → 0 as p → ∞. Our result is
stronger for the first case.
4.3 Higher-dimensional supersingular abelian varieties
In this section we briefly sketch the application of the main result to supersingular
abelian varieties of dimension g ≥ 2 defined over non-prime fields.
We first consider simple supersingular abelian varieties of dimension g = 2. Such
varieties, known as abelian surfaces, can be described as Jacobians of genus 2 curves.
Cardona and Nart [22] give a detailed description of the possible group orders and
embedding degrees for simple supersingular abelian surfaces, analogous to the Menezes-
Okamoto-Vanstone classification for elliptic curves.
Table 4.1 lists the isogeny classes of simple supersingular abelian surfaces over
Fq and their respective embedding degree k, as determined by Cardona and Nart.
The isogeny classes are described by a pair of integers (s, t), which correspond to the
coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius x4 + sx3 + tx2 + sqx+ q2. An
asterisk next to the embedding degree indicates that the minimal embedding field is
Fqk/2 , not Fqk .
When the extension degree m is prime, as is most often the case in practice, corollary
4.1.7 tells us that if r > Φk(p) then the minimal embedding field of a supersingular
abelian surface with respect to r is Fpk . For the cases of small characteristic, we have
the following result.
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Proposition 4.3.1. Let J be a simple supersingular abelian surface over Fq, where
q = pm, p ∈ {2, 3, 5}, and m is prime. Suppose J has embedding degree k with respect
to a prime r > m. If r > 781 then the minimal embedding field of J with respect to r
is Fqk .
For more general situations, table 4.1 gives two parameters for each isogeny class
that are related to the minimal embedding field. A value of a in the column “Cor. 4.1.7
max ρ” indicates that whenever r - km is prime and ρ < a, corollary 4.1.7 implies that
an abelian variety in the isogeny class has minimal embedding field equal to either Fqk
with respect to r, or Fqk/2 in the asterisked cases. When the value is a−  one can take
 = a/ log2 r.
A value of b in the column “RS max ρ” indicates that whenever r is prime and
ρ < b, Rubin and Silverberg’s result (theorem 4.1.2) implies that an abelian variety in
the isogeny class has minimal embedding field Fqk with respect to r (or Fqk/2 in the
asterisked cases). When p is not fixed, the values b are limits as p→∞.
(s, t) conditions on p and m k Cor. 4.1.7 max ρ RS max ρ
(0,−2q) m odd 1 6 6
(0, 2q) m even, p ≡ 1 (mod 4) 2 6−  4
(2
√
q, 3q) m even, p ≡ 1 (mod 3) 3* 8/3 4
(−2√q, 3q) m even, p ≡ 1 (mod 3) 3 20/3−  4
(0, 0) m odd, p 6= 2 4 3−  3
(0, 0) m even, p 6≡ 1 (mod 8) 4 3−  2
(0, q) m odd 3 10/3 3
(0,−q) m odd, p 6= 3 6 10/3−  3
(0,−q) m even, p 6≡ 1 (mod 12) 6 10/3−  2
(
√
q, q) m even, p 6≡ 1 (mod 5) 5* 8/5 2
(−√q, q) m even, p 6≡ 1 (mod 5) 5 12/5−  2
(±√5q, 3q) m odd, p = 5 5 6/5 2.06
(±√2q, q) m odd, p = 2 12 5/3−  1.18
Table 4.1: Isogeny classes of simple supersingular abelian surfaces over Fq.
An interesting situation to analyse is the case of supersingular abelian varieties of
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dimension g = 4. Rubin and Silverberg [112, §5.1] showed that if q = 3m and E is a
supersingular elliptic curve over Fq with embedding degree 6, then there is a simple
4-dimensional abelian variety J/Fq with embedding degree k = 30. This J can be
constructed as a subvariety of the restriction of scalars ResFq5/Fq E.
Proposition 4.3.2. Let q = 3m with m odd, and let A be a simple supersingular 4-
dimensional abelian variety over Fq that has embedding degree 30 with respect to a prime
r - 30m. If either
• ρ < 28
15
(
1− 1
log2 r
)
, or
• m is prime and r > 8400,
then A has minimal embedding field Fq30.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Proposition 4.2.1. uunionsq
We note that if J is an abelian variety as in proposition 4.3.2, Rubin and Silverberg’s
result (pheorem 4.1.2) shows that the result holds whenever r > (1 +
√
3)8m/3, or
ρ / 1.64. Thus our result (ρ / 1.87) is stronger.
4.4 Discussion
For an abelian variety J defined over a finite field Fq such that J has embedding degree
k with respect to a subgroup of prime order r, the question of knowing whether or not
the minimal embedding field of J with respect to r is Fqk can be answered in terms of
q, r and k under certain conditions expressed in theorem 4.1.6 and corollary 4.1.7.
When theorem 4.1.6 is applied to supersingular elliptic curves (section 4.2) and to
supersingular genus 2 curves (section 4.3), by computing a maximum ρ-value for which
the minimal embedding field must be Fqk , it, most of the time, results in larger allowable
ρ-values than the corresponding result of Rubin and Silverberg (theorem 4.1.2).
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Another interesting result is that theorem 4.1.6 holds for general abelian vari-
eties, not only supersingular ones. Several results demonstrate the existence of non-
supersingular abelian varieties over extension fields with small embedding degree [48,
69], but at present only a single explicit construction of such varieties has been ex-
hibited. This construction, due to Hitt O’Connor, McGuire, Naehrig and Streng [70,
Algorithm 3], produces abelian surfaces over Fp2 with p-rank 1, i.e. neither ordinary
nor supersingular, and ρ ≈ 16. These ρ-values are far too large both for practical use
and for Corollary 4.1.7 to provide any useful result.
The construction of non-supersingular abelian varieties over non-prime fields with
small embedding degree and ρ < 16 is still an open-problem. Finding such varieties
would not only expand the library of pairing-friendly abelian varieties but could po-
tentially lead to different improvements in practice. In this case the results presented
in this chapter could be used in order to describe the minimal embedding field of these
varieties.
As efficiency is one of the major concerns when it comes to implementing and using
pairings we will now focus in the next chapter on how to improve their computational
speed.
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5Pairings and efficiency
In all affairs it’s a healthy thing now and then to hang a question
mark on the things you have long taken for granted.
B. Russell
Using the important techniques listed in chapter 3 (section 3.3), improves Miller’s
algorithm. We will now consider closely how to handle the fifth one, to efficiently
compute the final exponentiation.
5.1 The final exponentiation
After the Miller loop the Tate pairing carries out an extra step to ensure a unique result
of the pairing, as f must be raised to be power (pk − 1)/r. Since p, k and r are fixed
system parameters it is possible to optimise the so-called final exponentiation.
We start by restricting our attention to the case of even embedding degrees, which
are more useful and practical, as they support the important denominator elimination
optimization [8]. Thus the final exponent can be broken down into three components.
Let d = k/2. Then
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(pk − 1)/r = (pd − 1) · [(pd + 1)/Φk(p)] · [Φk(p)/r].
The field characteristic being p, the first two parts of the exponentiation only con-
sists of applying the Frobenius operator [14] in order to raise to the power of p. This
results in an almost free computation, as such, the first two parts are called easy. More
than being cheap, although it requires an extension field division, the first part of
the exponentiation simplifies the rest of the final exponentiation. After raising to the
power of (pd− 1) the field element becomes unitary [122], i.e. an element α with norm
NF
pk
/F
pd
(α) = 1. This has important implications, as squaring of unitary elements is
significantly cheaper than squaring of non-unitary elements, and any future inversions
can be implemented by simple conjugation [129], [122], [61], [99].
Once the easy part is computed the hard part of the final exponentiation still re-
mains, that is, raising to the power of Φk(p)/r. This is usually done by expressing this
exponent to the base p as λn−1 · pn−1 + ... + λ1 · p + λ0, where n = ϕ(k). If the value
to be exponentiated is m, then we need to calculate
mλn−1·p
n−1
....mλ1·p ·mλ0 ,
which can be rewritten
(mp
n−1
)λn−1.....(mp)λ1 ·mλ0 .
The mp
i
can be calculated using the Frobenius, and the hard part of the final expo-
nentiation can be computed using a fast multi-exponentiation algorithm [66], [56], [92].
However, doing so does not take advantage of the form of the polynomial describing
p and r. We will now present, for some families of pairing-friendly elliptic curve having
ρ-value close to 1, a new method benefiting from the construction of the curves in order
to efficiently compute the hard part of the exponentiation.
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5.1.1 MNT curves
As recalled in chapter 3, MNT pairing-friendly elliptic curves with embedding degree
k = 6 can be parameterised using the following polynomials:
t(x) = x+ 1
r(x) = x2 − x+ 1
p(x) = x2 + 1.
In this case the hard part of the final exponentiation is (p2 − p + 1)/r. Substituting
p and r by their respective corresponding polynomials from above leads to (x4 + x2 +
1)/(x2 − x + 1) = x2 + x + 1. By expressing it to the base p, it becomes (p + x) and
the hard part of the final exponentiation is mp.mx. This is done by only using an
application of the Frobenius and an exponentiation to the power of x. The advantage
of deriving the hard part of the exponentiation in terms of the family parameter x is
clearly illustrated in this simple case, as x is only half the size of p.
5.1.2 BN curves
Pairing-friendly elliptic curves from the BN family have embedding degree 12, and can
be parameterised as follows:
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1
p(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x+ 1.
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In this case the hard part of the final exponentiation is to the power of (p4− p2 + 1)/r.
After substituting the polynomials for p and r this can be expressed to the base p as
λ3.p
3 + λ2.p
2 + λ1.p+ λ0,
where
λ3(x) = 1;
λ2(x) = 6x
2 + 1;
λ1(x) = −36x3 − 18x2 − 12x+ 1;
λ0(x) = −36x3 − 30x2 − 18x− 2.
Although this expression is more complex than in the case of MNT curves it is
still possible to handle it efficiently taking a new approach. BN curves being very
plentiful, it is possible to choose x with low Hamming weight. The resulting polynomial
r(x) then, has low Hamming weight, allowing a faster computation of the Miller loop.
The next stage is the computation of mx, mx
2
= (mx)x and mx
3
= (mx
2
)x. These
are simple exponentiations, and the low Hamming weight of x ensures that each one
of them requires a minimum number of multiplications when using a simple square-
and-multiply algorithm. Then computing mp, mp
2
, mp
3
, (mx)p, (mx
2
)p, (mx
3
)p and
(mx
2
)p
2
can be done efficiently by using the Frobenius. If we group the elements of the
exponentiation together, the expression becomes:
[mp ·mp2 ·mp3 ]·[1/m]2 ·[(mx2)p2 ]6 ·[(mx)p]12 ·[mx/((mx2)p)]18 ·[1/mx2 ]30 ·[mx3 ·(mx3)p]36.
Recalling that division costs the same as multiplication, as inversion is just a con-
jugation for unitary elements, the individual components between the square brackets
can be calculated using only four multiplications. This leaves us with a calculation of
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the form:
y0 · y12 · y26 · y312 · y418 · y530 · y636. (5.1.1)
In fact, the exponents in this expression are simply the coefficients that arise in the λi
equations. Thus, the initial question, of knowing how to efficiently compute the hard
part of the exponentiation, boils down to how best to evaluate the above product.
The goal being the minimization of the number of multiplications, Olivos’ algo-
rithm [104] [7, Section 9.2] is perfectly suited to this case. Given a number n, we define
an addition chain as a set of integers such that each element can be written as the sum
of two previous elements, the first element of the chain being 1 and the last one being
n. When a set S is given, instead of a number, the resulting chain, including all the
elements of S, is called an addition sequence. The idea behind Olivos’s algorithm is
to consider all the exponents as a set and return the corresponding shortest addition
sequence. This results in an optimal decomposition of the exponentiations. When this
strategy is applied to equation 5.1.1, it leads to the following addition sequence:
{1, 2, 6, 12, 18, 30, 36} → {1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 18, 30, 36}.
To obtain a proper addition sequence we see that 3 must be added to the initial set.
This is the only element not belonging to the set of exponents, which means less work
to do the evaluation.
In our case Olivos’ algorithm consists in considering the vectors Yi = (0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0),
the i-th component of the vector being 1, and apply operations on the vectors such that
it yields the vector (36, 30, 18, 12, 6, 2, 1). This leads to the “vectorial addition chain”
given in table 5.1. In turn, it allows the evaluation of expression 5.1.1 using just two
temporary variables, T0 and T1, as described in algorithm 5.1. This part of the calcu-
lation requires only 9 multiplications and 4 squaring.
If we take the low hamming weight value x = −408000000000000116 suggested
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(y6 y5 y4 y3 y2 y1 y0)
(1 0 0 0 0 0 0)
(0 1 0 0 0 0 0)
(0 0 1 0 0 0 0)
(0 0 0 1 0 0 0)
(0 0 0 0 1 0 0)
(0 0 0 0 0 1 0)
(0 0 0 0 0 0 1)
(2 0 0 0 0 0 0)
(2 0 1 0 0 0 0)
(2 1 1 0 0 0 0)
(0 1 0 1 0 0 0)
(2 2 1 1 0 0 0)
(2 1 1 0 1 0 0)
(4 4 2 2 0 0 0)
(6 5 3 2 1 0 0)
(12 10 6 4 2 0 0)
(12 10 6 4 2 1 0)
(12 10 6 4 2 0 1)
(24 20 12 8 4 2 0)
(36 30 18 12 6 2 1)
Table 5.1: Olivos’ algorithm in the case of BN curves.
by Nogami, Akane, Sakemi, Kato and Morikawa in [102], it lowers the number of
multiplications/squarings over Fp from 7426 to 7156, which, in practice, represents a 4%
speed increase. Hence, this new approach to the hard part of the final exponentiation
leads to significant efficiency improvement, in the case of BN curves, but not only those
as will see next.
5.1.3 Freeman Curves
Freeman suggested the construction of pairing-friendly elliptic curves of embedding
degree 10, using the following parameters to describe the family:
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Algorithm 5.1 Evaluation of expression 5.1.1 using only two temporary variables.
Input: y0, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6.
Output: y0 · y12 · y26 · y312 · y418 · y530 · y636.
1: T0 ← (y6)2
2: T0 ← T0 · y4
3: T0 ← T0 · y5
4: T1 ← y3 · y5
5: T1 ← T1 · T0
6: T0 ← T0 · y2
7: T1 ← (T1)2
8: T1 ← T1 · T0
9: T1 ← (T1)2
10: T0 ← T1 · y1
11: T1 ← T1 · y0
12: T0 ← (T0)2
13: T0 ← T0 · T1
14: return T0
t(x) = 10x2 + 5x+ 3
r(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 15x2 + 5x+ 1
p(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 25x2 + 10x+ 3.
These curves are much rarer than the BN curves, and unfortunately it is not feasible
to choose x to have a particularly small Hamming weight. Nevertheless proceeding as
above is still possible:
λ3(x) = 1;
λ2(x) = 10x
2 + 5x+ 5;
λ1(x) = −5x2 − 5x− 3;
λ0(x) = −25x3 − 15x2 − 15x− 2.
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In this case the coefficients form a perfect addition chain, i.e. no elements need to
be added:
{1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 25}.
The optimal vectorial addition chain in this case requires 10 multiplications and 2
squarings.
5.1.4 KSS Curves
The Kachisa, Schaeffer and Scott method leads to few families with different embedding
degrees. We will consider the families with embedding degree k = 8 and k = 18.
KSS curves (k = 8): The parameters for this family are given by:
t(x) =
1
15
(2x3 − 11x+ 15)
r(x) =
1
450
(x4 − 8x2 + 25)
p(x) =
1
180
(x6 + 2x5 − 3x4 + 8x3 − 15x2 − 82x+ 125).
We note that, as BN curves, these curves are plentiful, and then x can be chosen
to have a low Hamming weight. The decomposition of the hard part to base p yields:
λ3(x) =
1
6
(15x2 + 30x+ 75)
λ2(x) =
1
6
(2x5 + 4x4 − x3 + 26x2 − 55x− 144)
λ1(x) =
1
6
(−5x4 − 10x3 − 5x2 − 80x+ 100)
λ0(x) =
1
6
(x5 + 2x4 + 7x3 + 28x2 + 10x+ 108).
The major difference compared to previous cases is in the common denominator 6
appearing for each λi. Since in practice r will be large and coprime to 6, this issue can
easily be overcome by evaluating the sixth power of the pairing instead of the pairing
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itself. Thus the result of the exponentiation will still belong to a group of order r and it
suffices to simply ignore the denominator. It results in the following optimal addition
sequence which contains all the exponents in the above equations:
{1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 25, 26, 28, 30, 36, 50, 55, 75, 80, 100, 108, 144}.
The underlined numbers are the extra numbers added in order to complete the sequence.
Proceeding as in the BN case, the vectorial addition chain derived from this addition
sequence requires only 27 multiplications and 6 squarings to complete the calculation
of the hard part of the final exponentiation.
KSS curves (k = 18): This family is defined by the following polynomials:
t(x) =
1
7
(x4 + 16x+ 7)
r(x) =
1
343
(x6 + 37x3 + 343)
p(x) =
1
21
(x8 + 5x7 + 7x6 + 37x5 + 188x4 + 259x3 + 343x2 + 1763x+ 2401).
Although, as recalled in chapter 3 section 3.2, t(x), r(x) and p(x) evaluate as
integers if x ≡ 14 mod 42, x can still be chosen with a low Hamming weight. Then by
proceeding as usual we find:
λ5(x) =
1
3
(49x2 + 245x+ 343)
λ4(x) =
1
3
(7x6 + 35x5 + 49x4 + 112x3 + 581x2 + 784x)
λ3(x) =
1
3
(−5x7 − 25x6 − 35x5 − 87x4 − 450x3 − 609x2 + 54)
λ2(x) =
1
3
(−49x5 − 245x4 − 343x3 − 931x2 − 4802x− 6517)
λ1(x) =
1
3
(14x6 + 70x5 + 98x4 + 273x3 + 1407x2 + 1911x)
λ0(x) =
1
3
(−3x7 − 15x6 − 21x5 − 62x4 − 319x3 − 434x2 + 3).
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Using the same argument as in the KSS k = 8 curves case, we evaluate the cube
of the pairing to remove the awkward denominator of 3. In this case the coefficients
again “nearly” form a natural addition sequence. A relatively short addition sequence
containing all of the exponents in the above λi, is:
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 21, 25, 28, 35, 42, 49, 54, 62, 70, 87, 98, 112, 147, 245, 273, 294
319, 343, 392, 434, 450, 581, 609, 784, 931, 1162, 1407, 1862, 1911, 3724, 4655, 4802, 6517}.
It is interesting to note that, in this case, it is feasible to find a shorter addition
chain. However, if we take into consideration the fact that squaring is notably cheaper
than multiplication over an extension field, it may happen that a longer chain gives rise
to a more efficient computation. Here, it requires 56 multiplications and 14 squarings,
instead of 61 multiplications and only 7 squarings in order to complete the calculation
of the hard part of the final exponentiation. Hence, it can happen that slightly longer
sequences are preferable to shorter ones if it features more doubling and less additions
which, in turn, results in more squarings and less multiplications.
5.2 Discussion
One of the first remarks concerns the hardness of finding the shortest addition sequence.
In fact, it is an NP-complete problem [34], but since the values we obtained in each
set are relatively small, and the sets themselves already contained some addition “sub-
chains”, it is, in this context, not too difficult to generate, either with a computer or
manually, addition sequences containing the specific entries with length close to the
lower bound given for the length of addition chains [18]. Should a particular curve
result in larger or more numerous coefficients to be constructed into a sequence, Bos
and Coster suggest an algorithm for that scenario in [18].
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An other important remark is related to the length of the chain. In fact, since
squarings are significantly faster than multiplications over extension fields, it may, as
we have seen, be sometimes preferable to select a slightly longer addition sequence which
trades additions for doublings. From an efficiency point of view, the unitary property
implies that divisions are not more expensive that multiplications, rendering addition-
subtraction chains a good option for more complicated expressions. This would result
in “unordered” sequences.
On the sequences themselves, it is interesting to note their compactness, implying
that really few values need to be added to the coefficient in the λi. Those coefficients also
feature the special property of having relatively small factors, tending to be “smooth”
numbers. This seems to facilitate the construction of addition sequences. In some cases,
like the Freeman curves, the coefficient of the λi already form an addition sequence,
and if we extend the method to BW curves it often leads to addition sequences as easy
as:
{1, 2, 3}.
Other intriguing patterns emerge as in the case of the KSS k = 18 curves where the
three most significant coefficients of the λi are all in the same ratio 1:5:7. Coefficients
also appear to follow the same kind of distribution as numbers in a typical addition
chain.
One of the main benefits of this new method is that it allows the writing of com-
puter programs which automatically generate very efficient pairing code, given only
the polynomial equations defining a pairing-friendly family of elliptic curves [33]. This
is very much appreciated for practical use as implementing pairings is often hard and
requires a good knowledge of a wide range of primitives.
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logarithm problem
Something convincing is not necessarily true, it is only convincing.
F. Nietzsche
As computing pairings can be done efficiently Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [91],
had the idea of using them to map a hard problem over an elliptic curve into an easier
problem over a finite field. In fact, although their initial aim targeted supersingular
elliptic curves, it extends by definition to all ordinary pairing-friendly elliptic curves.
The hard problem of concern, namely the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (ECDLP), is defined for an elliptic curve E over Fq, P a generator of a subgroup
G of E(Fq), and Q ∈ G, as finding an x such that Q = [x]P . Using a pairing it is then
transformed into the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), which is the equivalent of
the ECDLP over a finite field: given α a generator of a subgroup G of Fqk , and β ∈ G,
find x such αx = β.
We can immediately and easily note that for the ECDLP to be unsolvable, one
must ensure that the DLP is also intractable, if dealing with pairing-friendly elliptic
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curves. Indeed, let Q = [x]P , with P a point of order r on E(Fq) ∼= Z/rZ ⊕ Z/nZ,
where n|r and n|(q − 1) [91, section II]. If we take a point G on the curve such that
(P,G) generates E(Fq), and a point S = [s1]P + [s2]G, for some integers s1, s2, then
er(P, T )
n = er(P, P )
s1ner(P, [s2n]G)
= er(P,O)
= 1
Hence the order of er(P, T ) divides n, and as n|(q − 1), er(P, T ) ∈ Fq. We also have
er(Q,S) = er([x]P, S) = er(P, S)
x.
Therefore if the pairing can be computed efficiently it is possible to solve the ECDLP,
by solving the DLP. Thus in order to clearly state which parameters should be used a
more advanced study of the best known algorithms to solve both the ECLP and the
DLP is required.
6.1 Theoretical view
From a theoretical point of view how an algorithm performs is based on its complexity.
Therefore, in order to know how easy it is to solve the ECDLP and the DLP we will
describe and analyse the most efficient algorithms known to date, for solving those two
problems.
6.1.1 Pollard’s Rho algorithm
Pollard’s Rho algorithm [110] is very interesting as it applies to any group, not depend-
ing on any specific structure. As such, it applies to elliptic curves, and is in fact the
best known general algorithm to solve the ECDLP.
The core idea of Pollard’s Rho algorithm relies on the birthday paradox, which states
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that in a random set of people, the probability to have two persons born on the same
date is over 50% as soon as the set contains more than 23 people and reaches 99% with
only 57. Adapted to the case of a cyclic group G of order n, it means that a collision
between two elements will occur in time
√
n.
In the case of G being a multiplicative group, the main goal is to obtain a collision
of two elements αa1βb1 ≡ αa2βb2 mod n, which yields
α
a2−a1
b1−b2 = β. (6.1.1)
This is achieved by first remarking that for α a generator, all the elements of G can be
written αaβb for β ∈ G. Then, if a collision occurs between two elements x and y it is
sufficient to know their decomposition into an α, β product, and apply the above idea
to find a similar equation to 6.1.1.
More formally, it is done by defining S1, S2 and S3, three subsets of G of approxi-
mately the same size, and three functions f, g and h on elements of G as follows:
h(b, x) =

b x ∈ S1
2b mod n x ∈ S2
b+ 1 mod n x ∈ S3
f(x) =

β x ∈ S1
αx x ∈ S2
x2 x ∈ S3
g(a, x) =

a+ 1 mod n x ∈ S1
2a mod n x ∈ S2
a x ∈ S3
This being set, it suffices to follow algorithm 6.1 in order to solve the DLP.
The running time is obviously the time required to get a collision, which is as stated
above, O(
√
n), for n the size of the group G.
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Algorithm 6.1 Pollard’s Rho algorithm.
Input: α a generator of G and β ∈ G, f(x), g(a, x) and h(b, x).
Output: logα β, or failure.
1: a0 ← 0
2: b0 ← 0
3: x0 ← 1
4: i← 1
5: repeat
6: xi ← f(xi−1)
7: ai ← g(ai−1, xi−1)
8: bi ← h(bi−1, xi−1)
9: x2i ← f(f(x2i−2))
10: a2i ← g(g(a2i−2, x2i−2), f(x2i−2))
11: b2i ← h(h(b2i−2, x2i−2), f(x2i−2))
12: i← i+ 1
13: until xi = x2i
14: r ← bi − b2i
15: if r 6= 0 then
16: return r−1(a2i − ai) mod n
17: else
18: return failed
19: end if
6.1.2 Pohlig Hellman algorithm
A less generic, but more efficient algorithm, relying on the use of the Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT), was discovered by Pohlig and Hellman [109]. In fact, they realised
that, when the order n of the group G can be factored into small primes it is easy to
derive a system of modular equations, which can be solved using the CRT.
More precisely, n is first decomposed into a product of primes
∏t
i=1 p
ei
i , then the
core idea is to see that since x = logα β is unique modulo n, knowing xi such that
xi ≡ x mod peii , allows to determine x by only solving a modular system of equations.
Another important point, is that, if xi is written to base p, xi = li,0+· · ·+li,ei−1pei−1,
and for each xi, x is viewed as x = xi + sp
ei for some integer s, we can consider
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nx− nli,0
pi
:
n(xi + sp
ei
i )
pi
− n.li,0
pi
≡ n
pi
(xi + sp
ei
i − li,0) mod n
≡ n
pi
(
ei−1∑
j=0
li,jp
j
i + sp
ei
i − li,0) mod n
≡ n
pi
(
ei−1∑
j=1
li,jp
j
i + sp
ei
i ) mod n
≡ n(
ei−1∑
j=1
li,jp
j−1
i + sp
ei−1
i ) mod n
≡ 0 mod n
And, since βn/pi = αnx/pi , this means that
β
n
pi ≡ α
nli,0
pi mod pi.
In the case where pi is a small prime factor of n, li,0 can easily be worked out, for
example by using Pollard’s Rho algorithm and so can all the other li,j . In turn, it yields
the decomposition of xi to the base pi. By repeating this process for all the pi, this
leads to a system of r modular equations, which can be solved using the CRT.
This strategy is expressed, from a more formal viewpoint in algorithm 6.2, which
has complexity O(
t∑
i=1
ei(log n +
√
pi)). From this complexity we clearly understand
that unless n is smooth, the Pohlig Hellman algorithm will not perform well as in the
worst case, i.e. when n is prime, it has complexity
√
n.
6.1.3 Index calculus algorithms
The index calculus method designates a way to calculate the index, as called in the
18th century, of an integer modulo a prime p, relative to a primitive root. The index,
or discrete logarithm as it is now called, is best computed using this method which
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Algorithm 6.2 Pohlig Hellman algorithm.
Input: α a generator of G a group of order n, and β ∈ G.
Output: logα β.
1: Decompose n into prime factors: n =
t∏
i=1
peii , ei ≥ 1
2: for i← 1 to t do
3: l−1 ← 0
4: γ ← 1
5: α← αn/pi
6: for j ← 0 to ei − 1 do
7: γ ← γαlj−1pj−1i
8: β ← (βγ−1)n/pj+1i
9: lj ← logα β
10: end for
11: xi ←
ei−1∑
j=0
ljp
j
i
12: end for
13: solve the system: 
x1 ≡ x mod pe11
...
...
xi ≡ x mod peii
...
...
xt ≡ x mod pett
14: return x
features a few different variants, all split into three phases. Note that this method only
applies to fields of the form Fpn , for p a prime and n a positive integer.
Given a group G ⊂ Fqk of order n, the first stage consists in taking two isomorphic
representations of Fqk and fixing a subset of elements in each of the representations.
Such a subset is called a factor base and is usually made of prime elements with norm
less than a fixed bound B. Then, the elements of the field are sieved in such a way
that only the smooth ones, i.e. the ones completely factorising over the factor base, are
kept.
Let F1 and F2 be two isomorphic representations of Fqk , α1 ∈ F1 and α2 ∈ F2. If
both α1 and α2 are smooth on their respective factor base F1 and F2 and α1 ∼= α2,
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then by definition, we get the following equality:
α1 =
∏
γi∈F1
γ
a1,i
i
∼=
∏
γj∈F2
γ
a2,j
j = α2.
Once sufficiently many such relations have been collected, the logarithm of these
equations is taken, thus resulting in linear equations in the unknowns, the logarithms
of the elements of the factor bases. The second stage consists in solving this system of
equations in order to find the logarithm of the factor base elements.
Although the matrix of equations is originally sparse, after only a few operations it
becomes congested, rendering the solving of the linear system a non-trivial task, that
can only be achieved by using structured Gaussian elimination or more advanced algo-
rithms, like Lanczos or Wiedemann algorithms [80, 139]. It is interesting to note that
some derived algorithms can combine a few of these methods [79].
The last phase of an index calculus algorithm is computing the discrete logarithm
of arbitrary elements in G. This is achieved in ways varying with each individual
algorithm, usually using a variation of the special-q descent, which is defined as follows.
For some element q not in the factor base, sieve elements as in the first stage, searching
for an element d, such that q divides the ideal generated by d, and the norm of d factors
into primes smaller than some value D. Then, factor the ideal generated by d into a
product of ideals and repeat the process until the bound D becomes smaller than B,
meaning that all the factors are in the factor base. Finally, q is written as a product of
elements in the factor base, allowing us to easily find its logarithm.
All the difficulty of this method lies in the balance of the two first stages, which
are time consuming. In fact, if too many relations are collected, then the linear system
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becomes too huge to be solved in reasonable time, but on another hand, if it is consti-
tuted of too few relations, then it cannot be solved. A trade off must then be found
in order to have both phases to take roughly the same amount of time, the third stage
being negligible compared to them.
From a general point of view, the index calculus method has a sub-exponential
complexity, i.e. neither polynomial nor exponential, but “in between”. More formally
a sub-exponential complexity is expressed by the so called L-notation:
Lq(α, c) = exp
(
(c+ o(1))(log q)α(log log q)1−α
)
,
where c is a positive constant, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We note that, α = 0 leads to a polynomial
complexity, while α = 1, implies it to be fully exponential. When c is unknown, the
L-notation is simply denoted Lq(α).
Before studying in more details two index calculus algorithms, we point out that
factorising qk − 1 can reduce the problem of finding discrete logarithms.
• For each small prime factor s of qk − 1, the discrete logarithm modulo s can be
computed using Pollard’s Rho method.
• For the larger prime factors l of qk− 1, the index calculus method can be used to
compute the discrete logarithm modulo l.
Although these results can be combined to compute the logarithm modulo qk−1 using
the CRT, this strategy also raise the question of knowing how to efficiently factorise
qk − 1. In fact, it is fairly easy if one consider the factorisation of
xk − 1 =
∏
l|k
Φl(x),
and then substitute q for x. It is also interesting to note that even if the use of
“heavy” algorithms like the number field sieve is required, this will not influence the
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overall complexity of the method, as they feature the same complexity, Lq(1/3), as the
algorithms mentioned below.
6.1.3.1 Function field sieve algorithm
The Function Field Sieve (FFS), due to Adleman [4], is an algorithm based on the index
calculus method which has the particularity of targeting fields of small characteristic.
As such it is especially suitable in the case of supersingular pairing-friendly elliptic
curves, defined over fields of characteristic 2 and 3, with maximal embedding degrees
k = 4 and k = 6 respectively. Thus, in this context, the pairings will map the ECDLP
over F2m to the DLP over F24m and the ECDLP over F3m to the DLP over F36m , for
m a prime, or a near prime.
The FFS, as for all index calculus algorithms, follows the main pattern mentioned
above, but has the special property of representing the elements of the field as poly-
nomial functions. Although a few variants exist, we will focus on the most efficient
version to date, which is due to Joux and Lercier [73].
Before going further into the details of the algorithm, we first define the field Fpkm
using an irreducible polynomial f(x) over Fp[x], and set a constant
d =
⌈√
km
(49)
1/3(km)1/3 logp(km)
2/3
⌋
.
In the original article presenting the FFS to solve the DLP, Adleman uses a general
bi-variate polynomial that must satisfy a list of eight conditions. However, Joux and
Lercier realised that, using a special class of bi-variate polynomials, called Cab curves,
only two of the eight original conditions needed to be satisfied. Reminding that a perfect
field is a field where every algebraic extension is separable, the following proposition
gives a definition of such Cab curves.
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Proposition 6.1.1 ([87]). Let K be a perfect field, K¯ the algebraic closure of K, χ ⊂
K¯2 be a possibly reducible, affine algebraic set defined over K, x, y be the coordinates of
the affine space and a, b relatively prime positive integers. Then the following conditions
are equivalent:
• χ is an absolutely irreducible affine algebraic curve with exactly one K-rational
place P at infinity and the pole divisors of x and y are aQ and bQ respectively.
• χ is defined by a bi-variate polynomial of form
H(x, y) = αb,0x
b + α0,ay
a +
∑
ia+jb<ab
αi,jx
iyj
where αi,j ∈ K for all i, j and αb,0, α0,a are nonzero, such a curve is called a Cab
curve.
The two remaining conditions, in order to be able to use H(x, y) in the FFS, are
stated as follows:
• H(x, χ(x)) is divisible by f , where χ(x) is some random polynomial of degree at
most bkm/dc.
• The order h of the Jacobian of the curve defined by H(x, y) is prime to (pkm −
1)/(p− 1).
These being set, we follow the strategy adopted by Joux and Lercier in [73]. At
first only pkm is fixed, then a Ca,b curve, defined by a bi-variate polynomial H(x, y) of
degree d is chosen. Note that no irreducible polynomial f(x) has been chosen at this
stage. To construct it, two polynomials χ1(x) and χ2(x) of degree at most bkm/dc are
picked randomly. If the polynomial defined by
χ2(x)
dH(x,−χ1(x)/χ2(x))
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is irreducible and has degree km, then it defines the polynomial f(x). Otherwise, a
new pair of polynomials (χ1(x), χ2(x)), is selected until a suitable pair of polynomials
has been found.
When choosing H(x, y) and generating χ1 and χ2, two cases must be considered:
• if d|km, then degx(χ1) = kmd and d.degx(χ2) + degx(H(x, y)) < km
• if d 6 |k, then d.degx(χ2) + degx(H(x, y)) = km
Once H(x, y), χ1(x), χ2(x) and f(x) have been properly constructed the following
homomorphism can then be defined:
φ :
F2 = K[x, y]/(H(x, y)) −→ F1 = K[x]/(f(x))
y 7−→ −χ1χ2
As described in section 6.1.3, the goal of the function field sieve is to find doubly
smooth elements. Therefore we define the first factor base, called the algebraic factor
base F2, as being composed of small prime divisors in the divisor group Div(F2), while
the second, called the rational factor base F1, consists of small degree, irreducible
polynomials in K[x]. Thus, F1 and F2 are defined by
F2 = {〈p(x), y − τ〉| deg p(x) ≤ B, p(x) irreducible and τ ≡ −χ1/χ2 mod p(x)}
F1 = {p(x)| deg p(x) ≤ B and p(x) irreducible} .
Let r(x) and s(x) be two coprime polynomials of degree B ≤ (49km)1/3logp(km)2/3.
Suppose that the divisor 〈s + r.y〉 can be factorised over F2 into a product of small
prime divisors 〈pi(x), y− τi〉. Recalling that we define h as the order of the Jacobian of
a Ca,b curve, each h〈pi(x), y − τi〉 is a principal divisor, and as φ is an homomorphism
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the following algebraic relation holds
(s+ r.y)h = u
∏
λi
λaii ,
where u is in K∗, λi are uniquely defined functions in F2 and ai are positive integers.
Applying φ results in an equality modulo a factor in K∗
(
s− r.χ1
χ2
)h
=
∏
λi
φ(λi)
ai .
As the above second condition must hold, h is coprime to (pkm − 1)/(p− 1), and thus,
the hth roots can be taken on both sides of the equation, yielding
(
s− r.χ1
χ2
)
≡
∏
λi
νaii ,
where νi = φ(λi)
1/h. Hence, if the polynomial sχ2 − rχ1 factorizes over F1 into small
degree irreducible polynomials pj(x), then the equation can be rewritten
1
χ2
∏
pj(x)
p(x)
bj
j ≡
∏
λi
νai .
The following relation between discrete logarithms is then obtained
∑
pi(x)
bj log pj(x)− log(χ2) =
∑
λi
ai log νi,
Once sufficiently many independent relations have been found, their discrete logarithms,
can be worked out using linear algebra techniques as briefly explained in section 6.1.3.
It is also interesting to note that, according to the work of Granger, Holt, Page,
Smart and Vercauteren [55], this technique can be adapted to use a superelliptic curve
instead of a normal Ca,b curve, to compute the discrete logarithm problem in a finite
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field of characteristic three. Using superelliptic curves makes algebraic computation
more efficient, but at the same time introduces three different cases, depending on
the gcd(km, d) being 1, d or another value. In fact they noted that, if three divides d,
then superelliptic curves cannot be used, and should instead be replaced by a Ca,b curve.
Once the discrete logarithm of the elements of the factor base is known, the next
stage is to compute the discrete logarithm of any given element e(t). In order to reach
this end, we follow the method proposed by Joux and Lercier [73].
Using an element of the factor base b(t), we generate a new polynomial a(t) =
b(t)ie(t), where i is a positive integer. As b(t) is in the factor base, the discrete logarithm
of e(t) can easily be recovered from a(t), and then, using the extended Euclidean
algorithm, a(t) can be written a1(t)/a2(t) with a1(t) and a2(t) two polynomials of degree
around km/2. If a1(t) or a2(t) is not smooth with respect to the bound Lpkm(2/3),
a special-q descent is used to compute their discrete logarithm. In turn, this strategy
leads to the discrete logarithm of a(t).
When the optimal value d defined above is used, the FFS results in a subexponential
algorithm of complexity
Lpkm(1/3, (32/9)
1/3) = exp
(((
32
9
) 1
3
+ o(1)
)
log(pkm)
1
3 log(log(pkm))
2
3
)
, p = 2, 3.
6.1.3.2 Number field sieve algorithm
The FFS targets fields of small characteristic. It cannot be used to solve the DLP in
fields resulting from pairings over ordinary pairing-friendly elliptic curves. However
in this new context, another variant of the index calculus method, called the Number
Field Sieve (NFS), can be used.
As for any algorithm based on the index calculus method it features the three usual
steps: sieving, solving a linear system of equations, and extending the computation
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of discrete logarithms from the factor base to all the elements in the field. However,
instead of considering elements as functions as in the FFS case, they are now viewed
as numbers. To analyse this new approach we follow the improvements introduced by
Joux, Lercier, Smart and Vercauteren [75], to the original NFS algorithm [119].
The computation is performed in fields of the form K = Q[θ], for θ a root of an
irreducible polynomial over Z[x], denoted f(x). At this stage it is important to note
that, although the ring of integers of K, OK, may not be a unique factorisation domain
it still is a Dedekind domain, implying the existence of a unique factorisation over
ideals. Therefore, the NFS will not deal with the numbers themselves but rather, with
the ideals they generate, one of the aims being their factorisation.
Not forgetting that the primary goal is to give two isomorphic representations of
Fpk , we notice that, if f has degree k and p remains inert in OK, then OK/(p) is a
field isomorphic to Fpk . In some cases it may happen that f cannot be taken of degree
exactly k, but only of degree l > k. To overcome this issue we recall that prime ideals
can be factored over OK and as such, if (p) is not inert but splits, i.e.
(p) =
∏
i
peii ,
and is unramified in pj , with inertia degree fj = k, then it is sufficient to consider the
residue field Fpk ∼= OK/pj. We denote by ψI , the map from OK to Fpk , and x the
image of x.
In the basic variation of the NFS, when p ≈ Lpk(2/3, 2/31/3), the sieving occurs
over elements of the form a − bθ. However as in the context of pairings the prime p
is smaller and the embedding degree k is larger, the sieving space must be extended
in order to collect enough relations to be able to solve the final system of equations.
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Therefore, the sieving must go through elements written in the more general form
l∑
i=0
aiθ
i, l ≤ k.
The first step of the algorithm, consists in picking a polynomial f1(x) which is
irreducible over Fp[x], has degree k and preferably has small coefficients. Then, defining
f2(x) to be f1(x) + p, it is clear that f1(x) and f2(x) have all the same roots modulo p
as they are equal modulo p and as such, have a common root in Fpk .
We can then define F1 and F2, to be two algebraic number fields such that, F1 =
Q[θ1] and F2 = Q[θ2], for θ1 and θ2 zeros of f1 and f2 in C, respectively. This setup is
represented in diagram 6.1.
OF1/(p) = Fpk Fpk = OF2/(p)
F1 = Q[x]/f1 Q[x]/f2 = F2
Q[x]
Figure 6.1: Diagram showing the setup of the NFS over Fpk .
Once this fields are defined, the next stage consists in constructing the factor bases.
This is achieved using the following lemma [75].
Lemma 6.1.2. Let K = Q[θ] and (a0, . . . , al) be an (l + 1)-tuple of integers, with
gcd(a0, . . . , al) = 1, then a prime ideal p dividing the principal ideal generated by∑l
i=0 aiθ
i, either has norm dividing fθ = [OK : Z[θ]] or has degree ≤ l.
This allows us to set up the factor bases to be the set of prime ideals which either,
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have degree less than l, or divide the index fθ.
Fi = {prime ideals p of norm < Bi / deg p ≤ l or NFi/Q(p)|fθi},
for some l that will be determined later, and fθi = [OFi : Z[θi]], i = 1, 2. From the
above factor bases set up, it is clear that appropriate values for the smoothness and
sieving bounds, B1, B2 and S must be determined at some stage.
While sieving, elements represented as (l + 1)-tuples (a0, . . . , al), ai ∈ Z and satis-
fying the following properties are sought:
• gcd(a0, . . . , al) = 1,
• |ai| ≤ S
•
l∑
i=0
aiθ
i
j , for j = 1, 2, have B-smooth norms in F1 and F2 respectively.
The norms of these (l + 1)-tuples in F1 and F2 are given by the resultants of the
polynomials A(x) =
∑l
i=0 aix
i with f1(x) and f2(x) respectively, that is,
NFj/Q
(
l∑
i=0
aiθ
i
j
)
= Res(A(x), fj(x)), j = 1, 2.
Once sufficiently many smooth elements have been found, the ideal generated by∑l
i=0 aiθ
i
j , (j = 1, 2), is factored into a product of ideals from the respective factor
bases Fj , (j = 1, 2). As the norm of these elements has already been determined to be
Bj-smooth, they can be written
NFj/Q
(
l∑
i=0
aiθ
i
j
)
=
∏
t
pett , pt prime s.t. pt ≤ Bj , j = 1, 2. (6.1.2)
At this point, a bit more work is required in order to give the prime ideal factorisa-
tion of (A(θ)). Therefore, we introduce the following result, that can be found in [100,
chapter 1, proposition 8.3].
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Proposition 6.1.3. Let p be a prime ideal which does not divide the ideal F = {α ∈
O / αOK ⊆ OK[θ]}, and f(x) =
∏
i gi(x)
ei mod p, the factorisation of f(x), the
minimal polynomial of θ, modulo p over the residue class field OK/p. Then,
pi = pOK + gi(θ)OK,
where the pi are some prime ideals above p. Moreover, each pi has inertia degree fi
equals to the degree of gi(x), and
p =
∏
i
peii .
Unfortunately, this result only helps to find the prime ideals occurring in the factorisa-
tion of (A(θ)), without giving any information on their valuations. Therefore we recall
a result stating that if p is a prime ideal in OK, then there exists a ∈ K\OK such that
ap ⊂ OK, and if p divides a given ideal I, then the ramification index of I in p is the
largest v such that avI ⊂ OK [26, section 4.8.3].
Once the practical principles underlying the prime factorisation of ideals have been
given, they can be applied to our case of concern, (A(x)). For each pt in equation 6.1.2,
not dividing the index fθ, (pt) can be factorised into a product of prime ideals
(pt) =
∏
i
p
et,i
ti
.
Then, each irreducible factor of gcd(A(x), f(X)) over Fpt , leads to an ideal pti lying
above pt. To find its valuation it suffices for us either to calculate k/ deg pti if the gcd
is irreducible, or apply algorithm 4.8.17 from [26]. It is interesting to note that this
algorithm also applies to the case where pt|fθ.
As the factorisation into prime ideals has been achieved it means that some relations
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over the ideals have been found. However, in order to find the discrete logarithm of
elements in Fqk , we need the relations to be over the numbers. Therefore, we now
discuss the conversion of relations over ideals into relations over the field elements.
At this stage two situations may arise, depending on the class number of K, and the
existence of a computable unit group.
We start by studying the easiest case, that is, when the class number of K is 1,
implying that OK is a principal domain. Thus, for all ideals pj = (pj , θ − cpj ) there
exists an element γj ∈ K such that pj = (γj). In this case, any ideal (a − bθ) can be
written as a product of these elements: (a − bθ) = u∏j γejj where u is a unit in OK.
Let (r1, r2) be the signature of K and define r = r1 + r2 − 1, then the unit group of
K is denoted UK = O∗K ∼= ν(K) × Zr, where ν(K) is a finite cyclic group of order ω,
ν(K) = 〈u0〉. By assuming that K has a computable unit group, it becomes possible
to compute the r fundamental units: u1, . . . , ur, and u can be written as a product of
these fundamental units and the generator of ν(K), u = un00 . . . u
nr
r .
Using this decomposition into a product of fundamental units, r logarithmic maps
Λi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , r are defined:
Λi : UK −→ Z
u 7→ ni.
Similarly, the logarithmic map Λ0 is defined:
Λ0 : UK −→ Z
u 7→ n0.
Thus, the final decomposition of a− bθ is given by:
a− bθ =
r∏
i=0
u
Λi(u)
i
∏
i
γeii .
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The next step is then to apply the map ψI to each side of the equation and take the
logarithms, resulting in:
log(a− bθ) =
r∑
i=1
Λi(u) log u¯i +
∑
i
ei log γ¯i mod p
n − 1.
Note that log u¯i, and log γ¯i introduce new unknowns to the system of equations,
implying that at least r + |F| linear independent equations need to be found, in order
to be able to solve the final linear system.
When dealing with the general case, one must be careful as the large subgroup in
which the computation is performed should have order not dividing the class number
of K denoted h. In fact, this is only a minor restriction as remarked in [75].
We recall that the ideal decomposition has already been obtained as
(a− bθ) =
∏
j
p
ej
j .
Then, raising both sides of the equation to the power h, yields
(a− bθ)h = u
∏
j
δ
ej
j , δ
ej
j ∈ OK s.t. (δj) = phj .
At this stage, a second difficulty is encountered as the most straight forward idea
would be to take the logarithms on both sides. However since there is no assump-
tion of a computable unit group, a basis of fundamental units for the factorisation of
u can not necessarily be computed. Each equation is likely to have a different u, so
taking the logarithms at this stage would introduce too many new unknowns and thus
drastically increase the number of equations needed and the time to solve for the un-
knowns. The solution to overcome this issue relies on the fact that as the logarithms
are being computed modulo l it is sufficient to work with the unit group modulo the
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lth powers of units, for if u ∈ (UK)l, then log u¯ ≡ 0 mod l. Joux, Lercier, Smart and
Vercauteren showed that the problem can be completely solved by using an adaptation
of the Schirokauer algorithm [118]. However, this being mostly a technical issue we
refer the reader to [75] for more details on the topic.
Assuming that the logarithms of the elements in the factor bases have been calcu-
lated, the next step is to calculate the discrete logarithm of any arbitrary element.
Following the method used in [75] for finding the discrete logarithm of an individual
element x, we start by representing Fpk as the field Fp[t]/(f1(t)) and find an element
y ∈ Fp[t]/(f1(t)), y = xitj for some non negative integers i and j such that:
• y ∈ F1 is B1 smooth,
• The factorisation of NF1/Q(x) contains prime powers ≤ l.
After finding such an element y, the principal ideal generated by y should factor
over F1. If there are some factors of (y) not in F1, then the logarithms of these elements
are computed using special-q descent as described in section 6.1.3.
The above investigation points out the complexity and flexibility of the NFS algo-
rithm, which lead to different variations with several subcases. The main drawback is
that no fixed complexity can be expressed. However it is obvious that it depends on
the size of the sieving space, given by the bounds S and B, and the degree l of the
elements over which the sieving is performed. Again, the value for l varies depending
on the ratio of the values of p and k, being given by the real zero of the polynomial
3c3l(l + 1)2 − 32 = 0, where
c =
1
k
(
log q
log log q
)1/3 = log p(log2 q log log q)−1/3.
Given that l can vary, so does the size of the sieving space and hence the com-
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plexity of the whole algorithm. The bounds are given by S = Lpk(1/3, c′) and B =
Lpk(1/3, 2c
′/(l + 1)), where
c′ =
1
3
(
2
(l + 1)c
+
√
4
(l + 1)2c2
+ 3lc
)
.
For this given size of sieving space and taking into account the probability of smooth-
ness [75] the overall complexity of the algorithm is given by Lpk(1/3, 2c
′).
6.2 Practical view
One of the main issues faced by the theoretical view is that it leads to asymptotic
complexities, not necessarily reflecting the real world. Therefore, having efficient im-
plementations of the different algorithms presented in the previous section would be of
a great help in our investigation.
Regarding Pollard’s Rho algorithm, there exists a lot of small improvements [133],
including parallelized implementations [137], however it is clear that its complexity will
remain exponential. Knowing the exact cost of the ECDLP is of a major importance
in the context of pairings as for families of curves having a ρ-value close to 1 the DLP,
solved using sub-exponential algorithms, must cost the same as solving the ECDLP
using Pollard’s Rho algorithm.
As for Pohlig Hellman algorithm, it is very efficient in certain rare cases that are
easily avoided, by picking a prime p such that the order of the large subgroup, in which
the DLP lies, is not smooth. Hence, implementing it in order to break the DLP in
general cases would result in a totally inefficient solution. Therefore, we now focus on
the two algorithms based on the index calculus method, namely the FFS and the NFS.
Note that Magma [3] does not implement either of these two algorithms. Instead a
version of the Coppersmith algorithm [27] by Thome [135] is used in characteristic 2,
while for extension fields of characteristic p > 2 the Pohlig Hellman algorithm is the
81
6.2 Practical view
best available.
6.2.1 FFS algorithm
Although really few implementations of the FFS exist, it is interesting to note that the
last to date exactly targets the context of pairings. More precisely, Hayashi, Shinohara,
Wang, Matsuo, Shirase, and Takagi implemented the FFS over fields of the form F36m
and were able to solve the DLP over F36.71 [65].
More than a simple implementation of the FFS, their article compares two versions
of the algorithm, both due to Joux and Lercier. The first variant is the one presented
above, targeting primarily fields of characteristic 2 or 3, while the second one is sup-
posed to fit fields of medium characteristic [74]. Surprisingly, the second one appears
to perform better in practice, featuring a more efficient sieving stage, based on a poly-
nomial sieve instead of a lattice sieve. Also note that this second variation of the FFS
has a worse asymptotic complexity.
The particularity of this version of the FFS is that it has a noticeably smaller sieving
space, still containing enough smooth elements, hence largely improving the probability
for an element to be smooth. Recalling that the goal is to find pairs of polynomials
(r(x), s(x)) which are doubly smooth, and that the homomorphism φ maps an element
y ∈ K[x, y]/(H(x, y)) to M ∈ K(x)/(f(x)), they fixed s(x) and tried to find r(x)
such that r(x)M + s(x) is divisible by an irreducible polynomial p(x) belonging to
the factor base. Then, remarking that r(x)M + s(x) + k(x)p(x), k(x) ∈ Fpk [x], is
also divisible by p(x), it is fairly easy to obtain all the polynomials r(x) of degree
less than a bound B such that r(x)M + s(x) is divisible by p(x). Therefore, when all
r(x) have been computed for each p(x), it suffices to check whether or not the degree
of r(x)M + s(x) is equal to the sum of the degrees of all the p(x) dividing it. If so,
considering gcd(r(x), s(x)) will lead to a new relation as soon as it is equal to 1.
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Together with this sieving technique they used a parallelized implementation of the
Lanczos method to solve the linear algebra part. By the end they were able to solve the
DLP in F3426 , a field containing a subgroup of order a 112 bit prime. The computation
was completed within 33 days, using a cluster with four nodes, each consisting of Intel
Quad-Core Xeon E5440 (2.83 GHz) 2 CPUs with 16-GB RAM, and three clusters with
four nodes, each consisting of Intel Quad-Core Xeon L5420 (2.33 GHz) 1 CPU with
4-GB RAM.
This new record is quite interesting as it is the first attempt at targeting supersin-
gular curves over ternary fields. Until now mostly fields of characteristic 2 were studied,
the last record to date being the resolution of the DLP by Joux [71] over F2613 . Once
the case of supersingular elliptic curves has been examined in practice the next stage
consists in solving the DLP in the context of ordinary pairing-friendly elliptic curves,
using the NFS algorithm.
6.2.2 NFS algorithm
Implementing the NFS is not an easy task, in fact there is no record of any general
implementation. According to the authors, the code used in [75] targets some specific
“easy” cases under which the DLP in the context of pairings does not fall. Thus, there
was no other choice than implementing the NFS from scratch.
In order to run some toy examples, we decided to start by implementing a linear
sieve, whose code, based on the GMP [2] and NTL [126] libraries, is given in appendix B.
Once it was running accurately and efficiently, it was possible to test our fast Gaussian
matrix reduction implemented using the MIRACL library [121].
One of the main issues, when implementing the NFS, is the hardness of some under-
lying problems. The first one to mention, is the determination of the class number. As
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explained in the previous section, the main idea of the index calculus method is to define
two isomorphic representations of a given finite field, which from a theoretical point of
view is easy to achieve. However, when looking at the construction of the polynomials
f1(x) and f2(x), one realises that although f1(x) is sparse and has small coefficients
f2(x) = f1(x) + p has a very large coefficient in its degree 0 monomial. In turn, the
presence of this large coefficient renders the class number of the field Q[x]/f2(x) hard
to compute [134]. Note that the closely related question of determining the unit group
is also hard to solve [20, 5], although certain cases in the NFS algorithm assume it is
known.
At this stage one of the most important things to realise is that even though these
parameters are required by the algorithm and are hard to figure out, they can be
precomputed and as such, will not influence the overall time needed to complete the
calculation of the discrete logarithm of a given element. Therefore one should focus on
the sieving stage.
In the context of pairings, the sieving must occur over a higher dimensional space
in order to get enough smooth relations to solve the linear system of equations. The
main problem arising here is that increasing the dimension of the sieving space results
in a large increase of the size of the norm of the ideals. Recalling that the main goal
of the sieving stage is to find smooth elements, it becomes evident that a huge amount
of factorisations of very large integers will be involved. Therefore some very efficient
smoothness test must be used.
The solution we adopted tries to take advantage of the best known algorithms for
factorising. We first start by removing all the small prime factors under ≈ 50000 using
trial division, then the Pollard’s Rho algorithm for factoring allows to find more small
factors, larger than 50000. Next, the elliptic curve method for factorising is used to find
medium size factors, while a quadratic sieve finds factors of the remaining composite
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part. Note that when a composite number is found, the Pollard’s Rho algorithm and
the elliptic curve method are performed recursively in order to work out its factorisation
into primes. Although efficient, this approach requires some refinements in order to fit
to the context of a smooth test.
In fact, if one realises that having too many large factors, i.e. factors beyond the
smoothness bound, is useless, then it becomes clear that when more than one “too
large” factor is found in a relation it does not give any useful information and as such
can be dropped. We decided to only keep relations including at most one large factor,
expecting some collisions between large factors, potentially leading to new relations.
If for a given large factor, no collision is found, then the relation in which it appears
is useless and can be forgotten. Note that, although some variants allow two large
primes, they in turn, result in a need for more collisions and a lot more complex
implementations [135] involving the use of graphs.
In practice this implementation performs well, as on average it takes only ≈ 0.35s,
on an Intel Core2 Duo CPU @3.00GHz, using only one thread, in order to run a
smoothness test on a ≈ 400 bit integer, while Magma [3] needs over a second. The fac-
torisation and smoothness test code, taking advantage of the GMP [2], GMP-ECM [1]
and FLINT [64] libraries, are given in appendix B.
The problem of fast smoothness testing being solved, the next issue to address is
how to handle the sieving space. Recalling that smooth relations must be found in two
different fields isomorphic to Fqk , it means that the norms of the elements have to be
computed in both representations. As the norm of an element
∑l
i=0 aiθ
i in a field Q[θ],
for some algebraic integer θ with minimal polynomial f(x), is given by the resultant of
the element considered as a polynomial in x with f(x), it is clear that its size greatly
depends on the size of the coefficients of f(x). In the case of f1(x), it results in small
norms easy to factor and which most of time, are smooth, while on the other side,
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the constant terms in f2(x) renders the resultant about p
l times larger. Therefore,
in practice finding doubly smooth elements is very hard, even using the usual trick
consisting of unbalancing the coefficients of the elements sieved, i.e. taking the ai of
completely different sizes.
In fact there is not best way to generate the polynomials f1(x) and f2(x). At
the moment the best that can be done is to balance the difficulty of the factorisation
between the two sides by taking both f1(x) and f2(x) with coefficients of the same size
as the square root of p. For a 55 bits MNT prime, that is a prime of the form x2 + 1
with x ∈ Z, this technique leads to a significant improvement as in practice the norms
on both sides are of size about 190 to 210 bits, compared to the initial 400 bits on the
f2(x) side.
However, in this case another problem appears as k remains fixed while p is a lot
smaller than in the normal MNT setup where p is about 160 bits (discussed in the next
section). This implies a larger value for l which depends on the ratio of p to k (end
of section 6.1.3.2). In this context the sieving space has an extra dimension leading to
results not mirroring the difficulty of the problem as it arises in practice.
Note that the technique proposed in [75] for p larger than Lp(2/3), can be adapted
to our case but will not give any improvement as either f2(x) is taken of degree not
much larger than the degree of f1(x) and then the norm will remain larger than when
f1(x) and f2(x) have coefficients of order
√
p or the norm will blow up because of the
degree of f2(x) being too large.
It is important to note that, although the NFS has an asymptotic subexponential
complexity, it features many hard underlying problems which render it really difficult
to implement, the main problem relying on the choice of the polynomials. In fact, in
the set up f1(x) and f2(x) must be two irreducible polynomials of the same degree and
sharing a common root in C, which is highly restrictive. Therefore, unless a new set
up or a new algorithm, is discovered, it is quite unlikely that the DLP can be solved
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efficiently in the context of ordinary pairing-friendly elliptic curves at the parameters
sizes of current cryptographic interest as we will now discuss.
6.3 Discussion
Among the four algorithms investigated, only two are really suitable to break the DLP
or the ECDLP in the context of pairings. In fact, although Pollard’s Rho algorithm
benefited from a lot of improvements [133, 137] it still remains exponential, rendering
it useless over the finite fields resulting from the pairings. However note that it is still
useful in order to determine the hardness of the ECDLP. At first glance, the Pohlig
Hellman algorithm has the advantage of being very efficient, however it is sufficient for
the field Fq to have a subgroup of order a large prime to render it completely ineffective.
In this regard, note that in the context of pairings the DLP must be solved in a large
subgroup of size r, r|Φk(p). Therefore, the best to date are the two algorithms based
on the index calculus method, namely the FFS and the NFS. Table 6.1 summaries the
main characteristics of these four algorithms.
Algorithm Problem Complexity Remark
Pollard’s Rho (EC)DLP Exponential No special structure required
Pohlig Hellamn DLP Polynomial pk − 1 must be smooth
FFS DLP Subexponential Characteristic 2 or 3
NFS DLP Subexponential Characteristic p > 3
Table 6.1: Algorithms to solve the DLP and the ECDLP
In order for the ECDLP to be unsolvable in the context of pairings, one should
ensure the hardness of the DLP, being aware that the efficiency of the algorithms used
for the ECDLP and the DLP is not necessarily equivalent. To make it more concrete,
we introduce the notion of security level, based on complexity. In fact, one assumes
that a problem cannot “possibly” be solved, in a reasonable amount of time and using
the best available technology if it has complexity larger than a given bound. Today
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the most common one is 280, but it is slowly steering toward the more secure level of
2128 [101]. Note that often a security level of 2n, is said to be n bit secure in reference
to the level of security provided by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [83].
Hence, in order to make sure that both the ECDLP and the DLP are hard enough
not to be solved, it suffices us to chose some parameters such that, the best algorithm to
solve those problems have complexity, for instance, larger than 280. In this case, on the
elliptic curve side the best algorithm available being the Pollard’s Rho algorithm, the
elliptic curve should have a subgroup such that the size of its order is approximatively
160 bits, while on the finite field side it should be of size about 1024 bits to be secure
against attacks taking advantage of index calculus methods.
Recalling that a pairing maps a subgroup of an elliptic curve over Fq, to a subgroup
of Fqk , with k the embedding degree, it becomes clear that the embedding degree must
be chosen carefully, in order not to map into a “weak” subgroup of the finite field.
Assuming that a pairing-friendly elliptic curve with ρ-value close to 1 has been picked,
the appropriate embedding degree is determined simply by dividing the size of the field
by the corresponding size of the elliptic curve group, for a given security level. For
example, at the 80 bit security level, 1024160 ≈ 6, so at this level, k = 6 would be an
appropriate embedding degree. Table 6.2 shows the approximate equivalence of the
efficiency of the current algorithms for both the ECDLP and the DLP [43].
Security level ECDLP DLP Embedding degree
(in bits) group size (in bits) group size (in bits) (ρ = 1)
80 160 960 - 1280 6-8
128 256 3000 - 5000 12-20
256 512 14000 - 18000 28-36
Table 6.2: Comparison of the ECDLP and the DLP using appropriate embedding degrees
Considering fixed optimal embedding degree, table 6.2 can be reinterpreted as a
diagram (figure 6.2) using a logarithmic scale. Note that the gap between the two curves
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DLP
ECDLP
Security level (bits)
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Group size
    (bits)
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32
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6
Figure 6.2: Comparison of the ECDLP and the DLP showing optimal embedding degree
widens as the security level and the corresponding embedding degree increase. Since the
field into which the pairings map becomes bigger, this may introduce some efficiency
issues, especially if no curve with ρ-value close to 1 is found for larger embedding
degrees. Regarding the shape of the curve note that the logarithmic scale applies to
the ordinate axis only. This explains why the evolution of the group size on the elliptic
curve is following a bent curve and not a straight line.
At this stage, we should have grasped the importance of appropriate choices, in
order for both the ECDLP and the DLP to be hard, however this may not be enough
if one review the results presented in chapter 4 from a new perspective. In fact, this
chapter can be reread with security in mind and as such, it presents some major results
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on the security of pairings over elliptic curves and more generally over abelian varieties.
Considering Hitt’s result [69] not from a mathematical point of view, but from a
security perspective, it points out a potential, but crucial, security issue as the minimal
embedding field may be a lot smaller than initially thought. In this regard, the new
result presented in chapter 4, is of value as it gives some easy conditions to satisfy, in
order for the minimal embedding field to be Fqk , ensuring the security of the pairings.
An especially interesting case is when the supersingular curve has embedding de-
gree k = 4. In fact, since ρ ≈ 3/2 is recommended for these curves to achieve an
80bits security level, our result (chapter 4) shows that supersingular k = 4 curves are
appropriate for this security level for any extension degree m.
We remark that the same consideration also applies to supersingular elliptic curves
with embedding degree 6, that is there is no collapse of the minimal embedding field.
This implying that Hitt’s results does not apply to the curves best fitting the standard
80 bit security level, i.e. the most used in practice.
Once the security of the ECDLP and the DLP have been assessed, the next stage
is to clearly express what parameters should be used in order to securely implement
pairings. In this regard table 6.3 gives a correspondence between the security level to be
achieved and the curve to be used. The first column of the table describes the security
level. The second and third columns give the ECDLP group size and the DLP finite field
size with corresponding security levels respectively. The fourth and fifth column show
the necessary sizes of the fields for corresponding security levels of the DLP in binary
and ternary fields respectively. The last column gives the non-supersingular pairing-
friendly elliptic curve and finite field with equivalent ECDLP and DLP security.
Analysing more attentively table 6.3 leads to following important remarks:
• It is not possible to balance the security of the ECDLP over Fpm and the DLP
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Security level ECDLP DLP p > 3 DLP DLP Ordinary
(in bits) size of r (in bits) size of pk (in bits) p = 2 p = 3 curves (ρ ≈ 1)
80 160 960 (6× 160) F24×367 F36×163 Fp6 (MNT)
96 192 1920 (10× 192) F24×613 F36×313 Fp10 (Freeman)
128 256 3072 (12× 256) F24×1223 F36×509 Fp12 (BN)
192 384 7680 (20× 384) F24×2837 F36×1193 -
256 512 16384 (32× 512) F24×6367 F36×2971 -
Table 6.3: Comparison of the ECDLP and the DLP in finite fields of various characteristic
over Fpkm , p = 2, 3, because of the lower embedding degree and the specialised
algorithms for the DLP in fields of low characteristic. For example, over F2163 ,
the optimal embedding degree being 4, one would expect the pairing to map
the ECDLP to the DLP in F2652 . However, as the current record for computing
discrete logarithms in finite fields of characteristic 2 held by Joux is over F2613 [71]
and was set some years ago, it is safe to conjecture that with the general advances
in computing, the DLP over F2652 is no longer secure. Using supersingular curves,
however, does have other advantages and the specific needs for the performance
should also be taken into account. This discussion being beyond the scope of this
chapter, for more information of this nature, the reader is referred to [57].
• Due to the lower density of prime numbers, it becomes more difficult to find
supersingular curves as the security level increases. As shown on figure 6.3, rep-
resenting the group size as a function of the security level, supersingular curves
on characteristic two or three need a much larger group size than ordinary curves
on characteristic p to achieve the same security level.
• There is as yet no known construction method for pairing-friendly elliptic curves
with ρ ≈ 1 and k > 12. Therefore, the table contains a dash for the 256 and
192 bit security levels as in these cases, the appropriate embedding degrees is
required to be larger than 12. However note that the KSS curves with embedding
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DLP (p=2,3)
DLP (p>3)
Security level (bits)
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15,000
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Figure 6.3: Security level of supersingular and ordinary curves
degree k = 18 have a ρ-value close to 4/3, rendering them suitable for the 192 bit
security level.
It is interesting to note that, as a pairing maps the ECDLP over Fq into the DLP
over a subgroup of Fqk of order r, namely the group of rth roots of unity in Fqk , it has
been possible to show [59] that it is more efficient to solve the DLP in the cyclotomic
subgroup of order ϕk(q) of the extension field, rather than in the extension field itself.
In fact, the algorithm proposed in [59] is another variation of the index calculus method,
which at first glance may seem to improve on the running times of the FFS. However,
the cases considered in [59] did not exactly mirror the situation addressed here, as only
extension fields having small primes characteristic, larger than 2 or 3, are targeted.
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The case of DLP in a subgroup over characteristic 2 or 3 is quickly mentioned, as
when m grows, so does the complexity, given by O((2m)! ·q(212m+32m log(q))+m3q2),
thus surpassing the complexity of the FFS algorithm. For example, in the case p = 3,
the complexity is ea, where a ≈ 57 and the complexity of the algorithm given in [59] is
approximately eb, where b ≈ 2921.
One of the major lessons learnt in the examination of the most efficient known
algorithms to solve the ECDLP and the DLP, is that those two problems are very hard
to solve, the available algorithms having either exponential, or at best, subexponential
asymptotic complexity. However as viewed through the implementation of the FFS, a
worse asymptotic complexity can result in a more efficient implementation in practice,
raising the question of knowing whether it is possible to adapt the FFS [74] to perform
better than the NFS, which is burdensome to implement, in the case of ordinary pairing-
friendly elliptic curves.
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7Pairings and identity based
cryptography
Why is there Being at all, and not much rather Nothing? That is
the question.
M. Heidegger
When using cryptography primitives two main requirements must be met: efficiency
and security. As we have seen pairings can be computed very efficiently and are really
easy to use in practice as it is possible to automatically generate efficient code [33] to
compute them. From a security perspective, if the parameters are properly chosen,
both the ECDLP and the DLP are hard to solve, implying the possibility to construct
protocols relying on those two similar hard problems. One of the areas benefiting most
is Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), first introduced by Shamir [125] in 1984, which
aims at simplifying certificate management in conventional public key cryptography.
In IBC, the public key is derived from an identifier, such as an email address or a
phone number, while the corresponding private key is created by a private key extrac-
tion algorithm which takes the identifier and a master secret as inputs. From 1984 to
the beginning of the XXIth century, several Identity Based Encryption (IBE) schemes
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were proposed [131, 136, 89], however none of them were fully satisfactory, as most of
the solutions proposed were unsafe, requiring the users not to collude. It is only in
2001 that Boneh and Franklin [17], Cocks [25] and Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara [115]
presented three revolutionary IBE solutions.
Cocks’ scheme is based on the difficulty of distinguishing quadratic residues from
non-residues in the ring Zn where n is an RSA modulus, and although encryption and
decryption are reasonably fast compared to RSA, there exists significant message ex-
pansion, which makes it somewhat harder to use in practice. Both Boneh and Franklin
(BF-IBE) and Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara solutions take advantage of the bilinear
property of pairings [108], but the Boneh and Franklin method also has the advantage
of defining a well-formulated security model for IBE. As we will see later, their model
takes into account the need to be secure against collusion attacks, and as they proved
their scheme secure in this new model their IBE scheme received much attention and
benefited from some improvements.
One of the main drawback of most such IBE schemes is that, although pairings can
be computed efficiently, it still remains slower than traditional public key cryptosystems
requiring only multiplications and exponentiations over finite fields. As such, the idea
is to lower the number of pairing computations, while keeping the system secure.
Following this idea Callas [21], described a generic framework for constructing an
identity-based encryption scheme using a conventional public-key infrastructure. The
main idea was to use an identity in order to randomize a key pair generator, such
that the Public Key Generator (PKG) could generate conventional key pairs for cryp-
tosystems like RSA [111] or ElGamal [38]. In fact, Callas’s scheme is not anymore
identity-based in a strict sense, as in his framework, the user can only obtain a public
key by accessing the on-line PKG and not by deriving it off-line from a given identifier
and some public parameters.
Another idea, due to Tang, Nan and Chen [132], was to combined IBE and some
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ElGamal like primitive. Unfortunately, it resulted in an insecure scheme, vulnerable to
collusion attacks, as the key generation structure was linear. In this chapter we will
present a way to overcome this issue using few pairing computations, but first we start
by presenting more formally the cryptographic primitives involved.
7.1 Cryptography
Although coarse, the presentation of cryptology proposed in chapter 1, gives a good
idea of what is cryptography about, and what are the main hard problems over which
it relies when used with pairings. Therefore we will, in this section, focus only on a few
more primitives.
Diffie Hellman Problems: The security of cryptosystems usually relies on hard
problems, among which the DLP is probably one of the most well known. The first
interesting variant is called the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH), and
consists in computing αab, given αa and αb, for α a generator of a group G.
An other remarkable hard problem, in the Diffie-Hellman class of problems, is given
by the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH), which states that given a tuples
〈α, αa, αb, β〉, one should be able to state whether β is equal to αab or is a random
value.
The last version we consider here is the Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDH). The
goal is to compute αab, given α, αa and αb, using a DDH oracle returning 0 if a given
tuple has a random element and 1 otherwise.
Multivariate Quadratic Problem: First introduced in 1988 by Matsumoto and
Imai [88] and later developed by Patarin [106], the MQ problem relies on the difficulty
of solving multivariate systems of equations. Let P1, · · · , Pm ∈ Fq[x1, · · · , xn], be m
polynomials of n variables over Fq, such that each of them can be written in the
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following form:
Pt(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i,j=1
β
(t)
ij xixj +
n∑
i=1
δ
(t)
i xi + γ
(t), with β
(t)
ij , δ
(t)
i , γ
(t) ∈ Fq
Solving a system made of m ≈ n such multivariate quadratic equations is proved to be
NP-complete even over a field of small characteristic [52, 107].
Symmetric key encryption: When it comes to security it is important to be
able to formalise the notion in terms mirroring the real world. For the CCA security,
it is done as follows.
Definition 7.1.1. A symmetric key encryption scheme is secure in the IND-CCA sense
if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A has a non negligible advantage
in the following game:
1. In the setup stage, the challenger randomly chooses a symmetric key sk.
2. In Phase 1, A starts probing the scheme by querying the encryption oracle E(sk, ·)
and the decryption oracle D(sk, ·).
3. In the challenge stage, A outputs two equal length messages (M0,M1) and gets
C = E(sk,Mβ) for a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}.
4. In Phase 2, A issues new queries as in Phase 1 but is disallowed to ask for the
decryption of C.
5. In the guess stage, A eventually outputs a guess β′ for β.
A’s advantage is defined by AdvA(k) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|.
When the size of an encrypted message is the same as the size of the original
message, the scheme is said to be length preserving.
Identity Based Encryption: From a structural point of view IBC can be repre-
sented by the diagram given in figure 7.1. The PKG has its own public/private key-pair,
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that is used to generate the private key of each user of the system. Using some public
parameters and a given identity B, A can generate the public key of B, and conversely
B can do the same, allowing A and B to start an encrypted communication without
the need for any public directory.
Private Key Generator (PKG)
ID B.ID A.
Public key
Master
Private key Private key
Encrypted communication
Figure 7.1: Identity based cryptography in practice
This can be formalised in an IBE scheme defined by four algorithms: Setup, Extract,
Encrypt, and Decrypt, that can be described as follows:
• Setup: takes a security parameter s as input and returns params and master-key.
From a practical viewpoint, params represents the publicly known system param-
eters, while the master-key is only known by the PKG. M is the message space,
and C the ciphertext space.
• Extract : takes as input params, master-key, and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, to
return the associated private key sk.
• Encrypt : takes as input params, ID, and M ∈M. It returns a ciphertext C ∈ C.
• Decrypt : takes as input params, C ∈ C, and a private key sk. It returns M ∈M
or a reject symbol ⊥ if C is not a valid ciphertext.
As the users’ private key is derived in part from the PKG key-pair, if some users
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collude together and are able to recover the PKG’s secret key, then the whole system
collapses. In the case of an IBE scheme, the IND-CCA security notion cannot fit as it
does not involve any security requirement against collusion attack. Therefore, Boneh
and Franklin [17] introduced the following definition:
Definition 7.1.2. An IBE scheme is said to be (t, qE , )-IND-ID-CCA secure if no t-
time adversary making at most qE private key queries has a non-negligible advantage
 in the following game.
1. In the setup stage, the challenger runs the Setup algorithm and sends the resulting
public parameters to a CCA-adversary A.
2. During phase 1, A sends queries to two oracles answering as follows:
• Key extraction oracle: given an extraction query 〈IDi〉, it returns the private
key associated to it.
• Decryption oracle: given a decryption query 〈IDi, Ci〉, it generates the private
key di associated to IDi. It then runs algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the
ciphertext Ci using di. It returns a plaintext M ∈ M or a reject symbol ⊥
indicating an invalid ciphertext.
3. During the challenge stage, A produces two equal-length messages M0,M1 ∈ M
and a target identity ID on which it wishes to be challenged. The only constraint
is that ID did not appear in any private key extraction query in Phase 1. The
challenger picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets C = Encrypt(params,Mβ, ID).
It sends C as the challenge to the adversary.
4. In Phase 2, A issues new queries as in Phase 1 but is restricted not to issue a key
extraction query on the target identity ID and cannot submit C to the decryption
oracle for the identity ID.
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5. During the guess stage, A eventually outputs a bit β′ and wins if β′ = β.
The advantage of A against the scheme is given by AdvA(k) = |Pr[β′ = β]− 1/2|.
We note that the main difference between IND-CCA and IND-ID-CCA relies on the
availability of a key extraction oracle in the case of IND-ID-CCA security. This models
the possibility that users have to share their secret key during an attack, on a IBE
scheme, in the real world.
Random oracle model: The random oracle model was first introduced by Bellare
and Rogaway [11], as an idealised security model used to analyse the security of certain
cryptographic constructions. It can be seen as a function mapping each input to a
random output, in a deterministic way, i.e. if the same input is given twice, then the
output will remain the same. Although the security in this model does not necessarily
implies security in the real world, it can be used to validate natural cryptographic
constructions, or model cryptographic hash functions.
7.2 A new identity based encryption scheme
Using the above primitives we construct a new IBE scheme and discuss its security.
But first, we start by explaining the main idea, showing how from ElGamal encryption
it is possible to derive an IBE scheme.
7.2.1 Framework
An ElGamal key-pair is defined by (sk = x, pk = (G, α, y = αx)). Given l such key-
pairs (sk1, pk1), · · · , (skl, pkl), we can construct a new key-pair (SK =
∑l
i=1 δixi, PK =∑l
i=1 δiyi), for some δi. However, this new secret key is vulnerable to collusion attacks,
as the master key can be efficiently determined by solving a linear system of equa-
tions [85]. Introducing non-linear terms into the structure would solve this problem,
but at the same time it would render the public key computation infeasible in poly-
100
7.2 A new identity based encryption scheme
nomial time as it would imply finding a solution the CDH problem. To overcome this
issue, we proceed as follows:
• Pick a pairing-friendly elliptic curve [43] E over Fq. The pairing is defined by the
following map e : G1 ×G1 → GT . Let P be a generator of G1 and α a generator
of GT .
• Pick l random numbers d1, . . . , dl.
• Compute U1 = d1P, . . . , Ul = dlP
If we define the secret key as D =
l∑
i=1
δidi +
l∑
i,j=1
βijdidj for some δi, βi,j ∈ Fq, then we
can efficiently compute the corresponding public key using a pairing:
Q =
l∏
i=1
e(Ui, P )
δi
l∏
i,j=1
e(Ui, Uj)
βij
=
l∏
i=1
e(diP, P )
δi
l∏
i,j=1
e(diP, djP )
βij
= e(P, P )
∑l
i=1 δidie(P, P )
∑h
i,j=1βijdidj
= αD
With this setup the secret key is protected by the elliptic curve version of the DLP
(ECDLP) [94] and the MQ problem. If an adversary wants to recover the di from the
Ui he has to solve the ECDLP. If t adversaries collude and get s private keys Di, they
can construct the following system of equations:

∑l
i=1 δ1id1i +
∑l
i,j=1 β1ijd1id1j ≡ D1 mod q∑l
i=1 δ2id2i +
∑l
i,j=1 β2ijd2id2j ≡ D2 mod q
...
. . .
... ≡ ...∑l
i=1 δtidti +
∑l
i,j=1 βtijdtidtj ≡ Dt mod q
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As all the δi and βi are chosen randomly this is a system of t multivariate quadratic
equations. Solving it would mean solving the MQ problem.
We now describe how to derive a new IBE scheme from these ideas.
7.2.2 A new scheme
The above ideas can be formalised into the four algorithms defining an IBE scheme:
Setup: Given the security parameter s and a parameter l ∈ Z+, the algorithm works
as follows:
1. Choose the pairings parameters, depending on the security level s to match, and
define the pairing e : G1 ×G1 → GT . Let α = er(P, P ) be a generator of GT .
2. Generate an l-dimensional secret vector SV = (d1, . . . , dl), where di is randomly
chosen in F∗q .
3. Generate the corresponding l-dimensional public vector PV = SV ·P = (U1, . . . , Ul),
where Ui = diP .
4. Choose an IND-CCA secure symmetric encryption algorithm SE of key length λ.
Encryption is denoted E(key, plaintext) and decryption D(key, ciphertext).
5. Let H0: {0, 1}∗ → {s1, . . . , st} ⊆ {1, . . . , l} be an identity mapping function,
which maps an arbitrary identity string to a t-size subset of {1, . . . , l}. Con-
struct a function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → GT based on H0, as described below. Choose a
cryptographic hash function H2 : GT ×GT ×GT → {0, 1}λ.
Thus, the system features the following specifics:
• A master secret key is SV , only known by the PKG.
• Some public parameters params = 〈q,G1,G1,GT , P, α, e, PV,H1, H2, SE〉.
• The message space M = {0, 1}n and the ciphertext space C = G1 × {0, 1}n.
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The H1 function takes a string as input and relies on the H0 hash function to
generate a subset {s1, · · · , st} ⊂ {1, · · · , l} of the indexes of PV . Then using these
indexes a product of pairings is computed so that H1(ID) defines the public key.
Extract: For a given identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithm works as follows:
1. H0(ID)→ {s1, . . . , st}, where si ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
2. Extract the private key:
xID =
t∑
1
dsi +
t∑
i,j=1
dsidsj .
3. Compute the corresponding public key:
yID = H1(ID) =
t∏
i=1
e(Usi , P ) ·
t∏
i,j=1
e(Usi , Usj ).
Encrypt: To encrypt M ∈M under the public key ID, do the following:
1. Compute yID = H1(ID).
2. Choose a random r from F∗q .
3. Compute a symmetric key sk = H2(yID, α
r, (yID)
r), and set the ciphertext to
C = 〈U, V 〉 = 〈αr,E(sk,M)〉.
Decrypt: Upon receiving a ciphertext C = 〈U, V 〉 ∈ GT ×{0, 1}n, decrypt it using the
private key xID ∈ F∗q do:
1. Derive the symmetric key sk = H2(yID, U, U
xID).
2. Recover the plaintext M = D(sk, V ).
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7.2.3 Considerations on the security of the new scheme
Although a security proof of the new scheme is provided in [24] two major problems
occur resulting in an incorrect proof. Indeed the first thing to note is that H1(ID) =∏t
i=1 e(Usi , P ) ·
∏t
i,j=1 e(Usi , Usj ) cannot be modeled by a random oracle as its output
is not completely random. This issue could easy be solved by modeling H0 instead and
use its output to get H1(ID). However, the second problem is more complex to sort out
as the number of queries to the random oracles should be bounded in order to avoid
collusion attacks.
In fact, the MQ problem is NP-complete when the number of equations m is
roughly equal to the number of unknowns n. However when the number of equations
is about n2/2 polynomial time re-linearisation techniques apply [29]. Moreover note
that although there has not been any precise theoretical analysis for the cost of solving
the MQ problem over a large field it seems that the MQ problem is not easier in this
case [13]. Therefore taking m ≈ 0.1n2 as suggested in [16] will prevent from polynomial
attack.
In the case of our new IBE scheme this means that the number of users handled
by the PKG must not exceed 0.1l2. For instance if l is taken to be 256 then the new
scheme would be safe for a small structure not containing more than 6500 users.
7.3 Discussion
The next stage is to test how efficient this new IBE scheme is in practice. From a
theoretical point of view it compares favorably to other IBE schemes proven secure in
the random oracle model. Table 7.1 gives a comparison in terms of tightness of the
reduction, ciphertext length and, number of operations. The usual notations qH , qE ,
qD are used for the numbers of hash, extraction and decryption queries, respectively.
P denotes a pairing operation, while E denotes an exponentiation in GT . In order to
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achieve a security level of s bits, the group on the elliptic curve must be of size 2s and
the group resulting from the pairing of size 2ks, with k the embedding degree of the
elliptic curve. The message length is noted n and the tightness of the reduction is given
by the complexity of the reduction.
Scheme Assumption Reduction Ciphertext Encryption Decryption
BF01 [17] CBDH O(1/(qEqH) 2s+ 2n 1P+2E 1P+1E
Galindo [51] CBDH O(1/qH
2) 2s+ n+ 80 1P+2E 1P+ 1E
LQ05 [84] GBDH O(1/qE) 2ks+ n 1P+2E 1P+1E
TightIBE [6] CBDH O(1) 2ks+ n+ 160 2P+4E 1P+1E
Coron [28] DSBDH O(1) 6ks+ 2n 1P+3E 1P+3E
New scheme - - 2ks+ n 2E 1E
- As the original proof of BF-IBE [17] has a flaw, the fixed reduction [114] is men-
tioned.
- Although, this can be done quite efficiently, LQ05 [84], TightIBE [6] and new scheme,
feature an extra computational cost due to the use of an extra symmetric encryption.
Table 7.1: Efficiency comparison between several IBE-schemes
In order to test the efficiency of the scheme from a practical angle, we first need to
define more precisely the hash function H0, which is used to map an arbitrary identity
ID to a t-size subset of {1, . . . , l}. This can be done as follows:
• Choose t cryptographic hash functions h1, . . . , ht.
• Take an arbitrary ID as input, compute si = hi(ID) mod l, output {s1, . . . , st} ⊆
{1, . . . , l}
As explained previously H0 maps a string to a subset {s1, · · · , st} of the indexes of
the public vector. Then using this subset, a product of pairing involving only the Usi
and P is computed. This defines the H1 hash function.
The next stage is the choice of the security level. Referring to chapter 6, to achieve
an 80 bit security level the group on the elliptic curve should be of size 160. Then,
using a supersingular curve with embedding degree 6 allows to match the 80 bit security
level on the finite field side. At this stage, being able to rely on an efficient and secure
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implementation of pairings [33] is very helpful. It would suffice to check on chapter 6,
in order to choose the best fitting curve to reach the expected security level, and then
input its parameters and used the efficient implementation returned by the program.
One of the main drawback of the new scheme is the number of pairings that need
to be computed during the extraction stage and during the derivation of the public
key from the identity. However, as only the product of all the pairings is required, not
the computation of each individual pairing, this can be done efficiently, by applying a
method proposed by Granger and Smart [58], instead of naively computing each one
independently and then multiplying them together. Furthermore note that t cannot
be chosen to be too small without compromising the security of the scheme, the MQ
problem becoming easier. In our experiments we picked t equal to 24, and l equal to
256. This allows the computation of the pairings to be not too time consuming while
preventing attacks targeting sparse systems, i.e. systems such that the probability for a
randomly picked variable to appear in an equation is a lot smaller than 1/2, in practice
about 1/100 [45].
Table 7.2 give a comparison of BF-IBE and the new scheme. The same IDs and
messages were used for the benchmarks, operated on a desktop computer running
GNU/Linux with Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz processor, 1 GB RAM. In both
cases the MIRACL Library [121] was used in order to achieve efficient implementations.
We observe that, although the extraction from the new scheme is slower, encryption,
and decryption are significantly faster. Once the extraction is done, the key can be
stored and then reused later on, leading to a non-negligible gain of time.
Scheme Extraction Encryption Decryption
New Scheme 318.06ms 4.12ms 2.25ms
BF-IBE 30.21ms 34.67ms 31.93ms
Table 7.2: Comparison of our scheme and the BF-IBE
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Another important remark concerns the number of pairings used. In fact, Sakai and
Kasahara’s scheme [23] does not require any pairing computation during the encryption
phase, which was a great improvement compared to initial IBE schemes. However, in
this chapter we go one step further by not requiring any pairing computation for both
encryption and decryption.
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Nothing is more dangerous than an idea, when you only have one.
Alain
Although the new identity based encryption scheme presented in chapter 7 does not
require any hash computation into one or both of the two elliptic curve groups involved
in the pairing, it is often the case in general [17]. For ordinary curves, the first group,
denoted G1, consists of points on a pairing-friendly elliptic curve E that are defined
over the base field Fp, while the second group, denoted G2, is instantiated as a group of
points on a twisted curve E′ that have coordinates in some extension field Fpd , where
d divides the embedding degree k.
Whereas for the Weil pairing, both input points must have prime order, the Tate
pairing and its variants only require one of the input points to be of prime order, as
it is sufficient for the other argument to be a coset representative. In fact, the most
efficient pairings to date, the ate [67] and R-ate [82] pairings, both variants of the Tate
pairing, have the special property of requiring the point of prime order to be in G2.
Hashing to a point of prime order in G1 is relatively easy, however, hashing to a
prime order point in G2 requires an additional multiplication by a large cofactor. In
this chapter we consider the problem of reducing the cost of hashing to a point of
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prime order in G2. This step may be necessary to ensure efficient implementations of
protocols using the Weil, ate or R-ate pairings.
Although points in the group G2, defined over an extension field may appear cum-
bersome to handle, Galbraith and Scott [49] observed that arithmetic in G2 is simpler
than it might be thought, as an efficient homomorphism can be exploited. In this chap-
ter we extend their ideas to the related problem of cofactor multiplication in E′(Fpd),
which is required to hash an identity to a point of prime order in G2.
8.1 Twist and number of points
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fp that has embedding degree
k > 1, with respect to a prime r, and E′ be a twist of E such that r divides #E′(Fpd)
for some d | k. If d < k we define G2 to be the unique subgroup of order r on E′(Fpd)
[67]. If d = k, that is E ∼= E′, we define G2 to be the cyclic subgroup of E[r] on which
the p-power Frobenius of E acts as multiplication by p.
As the 2 | k case enables the important denominator elimination optimisation in
the pairing calculation [8], we choose k to be even, and as such we can take d, the
degree of the extension field, to be k/2. Furthermore if the elliptic curve has a CM
discriminant of −3 and 6 | k, then we can choose d = k/6. Similarly, if the curve has a
CM discrimant of −4, and 4 | k, then we can choose d = k/4. Clearly the smaller the
degree of the extension field Fpd , the easier it will be to manipulate points on G2.
As recalled in section 3.2, the number of point on an elliptic curve E/Fp is given
by #E(Fp) = p + 1 − t, with t the trace of the Frobenius and satisfies | t |≤ 2√p. If
we now consider points whose coordinates are defined over an extension field Fpm , then
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the number of such points on the same elliptic curve [90] is, for instance, given by:
#E(Fp2) = p2 + 1− (t2 − 2p)
#E(Fp3) = p3 + 1− (t3 − 3tp).
In the general case the number of points can be calculated using algorithm 8.1 [90].
Algorithm 8.1 Computation of #E(Fpm)
Input: m, p, t: m a positive integer, p a prime, t the trace of Frobenius of an elliptic
curve E defined over Fp.
Output: #E(Fpm).
1: τ0 ← 2
2: τ1 ← t
3: for i← 1 to m− 1 do
4: τi+1 ← t · τi − p · τi−1
5: end for
6: q ← pm
7: τ ← τm
8: return q + 1− τ
A good way to represent the group G2, is to use an isomorphic group on a twisted
curve over the smallest possible extension field. The number of points on the twisted
curve can then easily be determined using algorithm 8.1. In the cases of quadratic,
quartic and sextic twists, it respectively leads to:
quadratic: #E′(Fq) = q + 1 + τ
quartic: #E′(Fq) = q + 1− f1 where f1 =
√
4q − τ2
sextic: #E′(Fq) = q + 1− (3f2 + τ)/2 where f2 =
√
(4q − τ2)/3,
where q = pm and τ is the trace of the q-power Frobenius on E as calculated in
algorithm 8.1. See [67] for more details.
To hash to a point in G2, the standard idea suggests to first hash to a general point
on E′(Fpd) and then multiply by the cofactor c = #E′(Fpd)/r. However, when consid-
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ering, for example, a pairing-friendly curve with k = 10, d = 5 and r ≈ p, this approach
becomes prohibitively slow, as using the quadratic twist implies for the cofactor c, to
be of a length, in bits, approximately equivalent to the size of p4. Therefore, we will
now investigate a new way to handle this hashing which will result in a work equivalent
to a multiplication by a value less than p, and even in some cases, much less than p.
8.2 Framework
Galbraith and Scott [49, Section 8] have already briefly considered the issue of fast
cofactor multiplication of points on E′(Fpd) in the case of BN curves [9]. The idea here,
is to generalise and extend their techniques, using the homomorphism ψ = φ−1pipφ,
with φ : E′ → E the isomorphism which takes us from the twisted curve E′(Fpd) to
the isomorphic group on E(Fpk), and pip the p-power Frobenius map on E. A major
remark is to see that ψ(P ) can be calculated very quickly.
According to the Galbraith and Scott paper [47, Theorem 1] general points on
E′(Fpd) obey the following identity:
ψ2(P )− [t]ψ(P ) + [p]P = 0.
Applying the usual idea consisting in expressing the cofactor c to the base p we get:
c = c0 + c1 · p+ c2 · p2...
and then using, repeatedly if necessary, the identity
[p]P = [t]ψ(P )− ψ2(P ) (8.2.1)
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it yields the following equation:
[c0 + p(c1 + p(c2 + · · · ))]P = [g0]P + [g1]ψ(P ) + [g2]ψ2(P ) + · · · , gi < p
Applying equation 8.2.1 to [c1 · p]P we get [c1 · t]ψ(P ) − [c1]ψ2(P ). We note that,
t being up to half the size of p (Hasse bound), c1 · t may be of a size in bits 50%
larger than p. Further applications of the homomorphism may therefore be necessary
to achieve a complete reduction. Hence, the final result is a recoding of c from a base
p representation to a base ψ(·) representation, with all coefficients less than p. The
number of terms in the representation increasing with each application of identity 8.2.1,
the following identity involving the kth cyclotomic polynomial, Φk, may be very useful:
Φk(ψ(P )) = 0. (8.2.2)
This allows terms of degree greater than or equal to ϕ(k), the Euler totient function,
to be replaced with terms of lower degree.
When k = de, and gcd(d, e) = 1, the twisting isomorphism φ, defining a twist of
degree e, can be chosen such that the twisted curve E′ is actually defined over Fp, in
which case φ is defined over Fpe . The cofactor c can then be factored into h · c1, where
c1 = #E
′(Fp), and the endomorphism pi′p − 1, where pi′p is the p-power Frobenius map
on E′, projects into the subgroup of #E′(Fpd) of order h · r. In terms, it means that
a point of order r can be obtained at the cost of just one multiplication by h, and as
such, the above technique only needs to be applied to the smaller factor, h.
8.3 Fast cofactor multiplication on G2
Although the basic idea, with minor modifications, can also apply to non-parameterised
curves like Cocks-Pinch curves, it benefits from better optimisation when the family of
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pairing-friendly elliptic curves can be expressed by three polynomials t(x), r(x) and p(x)
representing the prime modulus p, the group order r and the trace t, respectively. Our
aim is to exploit this simple form in a systematic way to further speed up the cofactor
multiplication required for hashing to G2. In fact, expressing p as a polynomial p(x),
allows both the coefficients and the cofactor c, to be represented and calculated as
polynomials in x which in turn leads to further optimisations.
Before proceeding with a few examples we start by formally describing the previous
method as an algorithm for reducing the cofactor multiplication to the evaluation of a
polynomial of the powers ψi(P ), with coefficients less than p (algorithm 8.2).
It takes the integer k, and the polynomials p(x), t(x) and c(x), where p(x) and t(x)
parameterise the field size of definition and trace respectively of the pairing-friendly
curve with embedding degree k. The polynomial c(x) parameterises the hard part of
the multiplication to be performed to obtain a point of order r on the twist of the
elliptic curve. The first step is to recode c(x) to the base p(x) (lines 3–6) then using
this representation of c(x), recode c(x) to the base ψ(·) (lines 8–13). The coefficients
of the base ψ(·) representation are computed using the coefficients of the base p(x)
representation and the appropriate coefficients of the equation
[pl]P =
l∑
i=0
(
l
i
)
t(x)l−i(−1)iψl+i(P ),
obtained by recursively applying equation (8.2.1). Once c(x) has been written to base
ψ(·), the coefficients gi(x) are checked, such that, if deg gi(x) ≥ deg p(x), then the
identity [p]P = [t]ψ(P )− ψ2(P ) is reapplied (lines 15–20). Finally the relation (8.2.2)
is exploited to obtain a base ψ(·) representation of c(x) of degree < ϕ(k) (lines 22–27).
We now apply this algorithm to certain selected popular families of pairing-friendly
elliptic curves, in order to improve the performs of the cofactor multiplication required
to hash to a point of order r in G2.
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Algorithm 8.2 Reduction of the cofactor c(x) to base ψ(·)
Input: k, p(x), t(x), and c(x) : embedding degree k and polynomials p(x), t(x), c(x)
parameterising the field size, trace, and G2 cofactor of a pairing-friendly elliptic
curve, respectively.
Output: g0(x), g1(x).....gϕ(k)−1(x): deg gi(x) < deg p(x) will be coefficients of a base
ψ(·) representation of the cofactor c(x).
1: f ← bdeg(c(x))/ deg(p(x))c
2: 3 First express c(x) to the base p
3: for i← 0 to f do
4: ci(x)← c(x) mod p(x)
5: c(x)← c(x) div p(x)
6: end for
7: 3 Make first pass to determine the coefficients gi of c(x) to the base ψ(·), using
equation (8.2.1).
8: for j ← 0 to f do
9: g2j ← 0, g2j+1 ← 0
10: for i← 0 to 1 do
11: gj+i ← gj+i +
(
j
i
)
t(x)j−i(−1)icj(x)
12: end for
13: end for
14: 3 Make a second pass to finally force all coefficients to have degree < deg p
15: g2f+1 ← 0, g2f+2 ← 0
16: for j ← 1 to 2f do
17: w(x)← gj(x) div p(x)
18: gj(x)← gj(x) mod p(x)
19: gj+1(x)← gj+1(x) + t(x)w(x)
20: gj+2(x)← gj+2(x)− w(x)
21: end for
22: 3 Finally exploit equation (8.2.2); ai is the coefficient of x
i in Φk(x)
23: for j ← 2f + 2 downto ϕ(k) do
24: for i← 1 to ϕ(k) do
25: gj−i(x)← gj−i(x)− aϕ(k)−i · gj(x)
26: end for
27: gj(x)← 0
28: end for
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8.3.1 MNT curves
MNT pairing-friendly elliptic curves can feature embedding degrees 3, 4 or 6 with ρ
value 1. The case of interest for pairing based cryptography, when the ECDLP and the
DLP are balanced and secure, is achieved for k = 6 (chapter 6). In this case the prime
p, the group order r and the trace of Frobenius t parameters are expressed as:
t(x) = x+ 1
r(x) = x2 − x+ 1
p(x) = x2 + 1.
There exists no x such that the curve generated using these parameters has a CM
discriminant of −3, so only a quadratic twist is possible. Here G2 is a group of points
of order r on E′(Fp3). The cofactor is
c(x) =
p(x)3 + 1 + t(x)3 − 3t(x)p(x)
r(x)
,
which in this case works out to be
c(x) = x4 + x3 + 3x2.
Applying algorithm 8.2 step-by-step we first represent c(x) to the base p(x) (lines 3–6):
c(x) = p2(x) + (x+ 1)p(x) + (−x− 2).
Now applying equation (8.2.1) to each term involving a power of p(x), and using it to
express [c(x)]P in base ψ(·) form gives (lines 8–13):
[−x− 2]P + [x2 + 2x+ 1]ψ(P ) + [x2 + x]ψ2(P ) + [−2x− 2]ψ3(P ) + ψ4(P ).
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One can see that some of the coefficients are still of the same degree as p(x), so one
applies equation (8.2.1) again to get (lines 15–20):
[−x− 2]P + [2x]ψ(P ) + [2x]ψ2(P ) + [−x− 2]ψ3(P ).
All of the polynomial coefficients are now fully reduced modulo p(x). From equa-
tion (8.2.2) we know that ψ2(P ) = ψ(P ) − P , and by substituting this identity twice
for ψ2(P ) into the above (lines 22–27), we find that multiplication of a general point
P by c(x) can be completed by calculating the point
ψ(4xP )− 2xP.
This means that the expensive initial multiplication of P by c(x) can be achieved using
only one multiplication by x, two point doublings, one application of the homomorphism
and a further point addition.
In fact, it can be done even slightly more efficiently. As discussed in section 8.2, since
k = 2 · 3 and gcd(2, 3) = 1, it is possible to choose the quadratic twist E′ to be defined
over Fp. As such, there must be a subgroup of points of E′(Fp3) which are defined over
Fp, that is, the points of E′(Fp). The number of points on E′(Fp3) must, therefore,
have as a factor p(x)+1+ t(x), and indeed, in this case c(x) = (p(x)+1+ t(x)) ·x2. As
explained in section 8.2, the first part of the cofactor multiplication by p(x) + 1 + t(x)
can be performed by using the Frobenius endomorphism on the twisted curve
P ← pi′(P )− P,
leaving only a further multiplication by x2. Then, using algorithm 8.2, it is evaluated
to simply be ψ(xP ).
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8.3.2 BN curves
The BN family of pairing-friendly curves [9] has embedding degree 12, and is parame-
terised as follows:
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1
p(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x+ 1.
In this case the cofactor multiplication can be done as [49]
ψ(6x2P ) + 6x2P + ψ(P )− ψ2(P ).
The major work here is the point multiplication by 6x2. As already mentioned, BN
curves being plentiful, a usual choice for x is a value having low Hamming weight, which
allows to speed up the computation of the pairing using Miller’s algorithm. In fact using
such a value for x will also speed up the calculation, as the point multiplication will
consist largely of point doublings, which are significantly faster than point additions in
most curve and point representations.
8.3.3 Freeman Curves
Freeman suggested a construction for pairing-friendly elliptic curves of embedding de-
gree 10 [40].
t(x) = 10x2 + 5x+ 3
r(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 15x2 + 5x+ 1
p(x) = 25x4 + 25x3 + 25x2 + 10x+ 3.
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These curves are much rarer than the BN curves, and unfortunately it is not feasible
to choose x to have a particularly small Hamming weight. Furthermore, since the
embedding degree is 10, the best that can be done for G2 is to represent it as a group
of points on E′(Fp5). This is a particularly large extension, increasing the chances for
the cofactor to be large. In fact c(x), in this case, works out as this polynomial:
c(x) = 390625x16 + 1562500x15 + 4062500x14 + 7421875x13 + 10750000x12
+ 12593750x11 + 12356250x10 + 10203125x9 + 7178125x8 + 4284375x7
+ 2171000x6 + 920250x5 + 322400x4 + 89875x3 + 19120x2 + 2740x+ 217.
Fortunately, it also has p(x)+1+t(x) as a factor, allowing us to apply again the idea in
section 8.2. We start by choosing the quadratic twist E′ to be defined over Fp, then the
multiplication by p(x)+1+ t(x) can be handled by the transformation P ← pi′(P )−P ,
and so the “hard-part” of the cofactor can be reduced to:
h(x) = 15625x12 + 46875x11 + 93750x10 + 128125x9 + 138125x8 + 116875x7
+ 80875x6 + 44875x5 + 20225x4 + 7075x3 + 1880x2 + 325x+ 31.
Applying our algorithm we find that multiplying P by h(x) can be expressed as:
[g0(x)]P + [g1(x)]ψ(P ) + [g2(x)]ψ
2(P ) + [g3(x)]ψ
3(P ), (8.3.1)
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where
g0(x) = −5x2 − 10x− 2;
g1(x) = −25x3 − 20x2 − 10x− 4;
g2(x) = 3;
g3(x) = −25x3 − 10x2 − 5x.
At this stage we could substitute for x and use a simultaneous multiple point mul-
tiplication algorithm [62]. However, equation 8.3.1, together with the gi, remind us of
the problem faced to compute efficiently the final exponentiation in Miller’s algorithm
(chapter 5), and the solution adopted, which consisted of using Olivos’ algorithm, to
find the optimal sequence of operations to perform. Therefore, we apply the same
strategy here, by calculating xP , x2P = x ·xP , x3P = x ·x2P , ψi(P ), ψi(xP ), ψi(x2P )
and ψi(x3P ) for i = 1 to 3, and then find the shortest addition sequence including all
the coefficients of the gi. Thus, the calculation first becomes
[25](−ψ3(x3P )− ψ(x3P )) + [20](−ψ(x2P )) + [10](−ψ3(x2P )− ψ(xP )− xP )
+[5](−ψ3(xP )− x2P ) + [4](−ψ(P )) + [3]ψ2(P ) + [2](−P ),
that we consider as
25A+ 20B + 10C + 5D + 4E + 3F + 2G.
While A,B,C,D,E, F and G are calculated using just 4 extra point additions, the
optimal way to proceed with the coefficients is to rearrange them such that they form
the shortest addition sequence:
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 25}.
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In this case, it is easily done by only adding 1 to the start. Now, we apply Olivos’
algorithm [104], [7, Section 9.2] to find the optimal sequence of point additions and
doublings to finally proceed to the cofactor multiplication.
T0 ← A+B
T1 ← A+D
T0 ← 2 · T0
T0 ← T0 + C
T0 ← 2 · T0
T1 ← T0 + T1
T0 ← T1 + E
T0 ← 2 · T0
T0 ← T0 +G
T0 ← T0 + F
T1 ← T1 + F
T0 ← 2 · T0
T0 ← T0 + T1.
The final result is in T0. This part of the calculation requires only 9 extra point
additions and 4 point doublings.
8.3.4 KSS Curves
Kachisa, Schaeffer and Scott [76] described a new method for generating pairing-friendly
elliptic curves.
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KSS curves (k = 8): The family of k = 8 KSS curves is parameterised as follows:
t(x) =
2x3 − 11x+ 15
15
r(x) =
x4 − 8x2 + 25
450
p(x) =
x6 + 2x5 − 3x4 + 8x3 − 15x2 − 82x+ 125
180
.
For these curves ρ = 3/2. As for BN curves, x can be chosen to have a low Hamming
weight. Proceeding as above we find
g0(x) =
2x5 + 4x4 − x3 + 50x2 + 65x− 36
6
g1(x) =
2x5 + 4x4 − x3 − 7x2 − 25x+ 75
6
g2(x) =
−15x2 − 30x− 75
6
.
A minor difficulty arises due to the common denominator of 6 which occurs here.
However, as noted in chapter 5, in practice r is chosen to be a large prime, implying that
gcd(6, r) = 1. Thus, we can complete the hashing to G2 with the point multiplication
[6 · c(x)]P , which is also a point of order r. As the denominator can be ignored, we now
only need an addition sequence which includes all of the integer coefficients that arise
in the numerator of the gi, in order the complete the calculation:
{1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 25, 30, 36, 50, 65, 75},
Proceeding as for the Freeman curve case, the computation using this addition sequence
can be completed with 18 point additions and 5 point doublings.
KSS curves (k = 18): The family of k = 18 KSS curves can be described by the
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following polynomials:
t(x) =
x4 + 16x+ 7
7
r(x) =
x6 + 37x3 + 343
343
p(x) =
x8 + 5x7 + 7x6 + 37x5 + 188x4 + 259x3 + 343x2 + 1763x+ 2401
21
.
For these curves ρ = 4/3 and as for the BN curves x can, in practice, be chosen with a
low Hamming weight. Proceeding again as above yields:
g0(x) =
−5x7 − 26x6 − 98x5 − 381x4 − 867x3 − 1911x2 − 5145x− 5774
3
g1(x) =
−5x7 − 18x6 − 38x4 − 323x3 − 28x2 + 784x
3
g2(x) =
−5x7 − 18x6 − 38x4 − 323x3 + 1029x+ 343
3
g3(x) =
−11x6 − 70x5 − 98x4 − 176x3 − 1218x2 − 2058x− 686
3
g4(x) =
28x2 + 245x+ 343
3
.
Using the same reasoning as in the KSS k = 8 case, we evaluate [3·c(x)]P to remove the
denominator of 3. In this case the best addition sequence we could find that includes
all of the coefficients was:
{1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 18, 26, 28, 31, 38, 45, 69, 70, 78, 98, 176, 245, 253, 323, 343,
381, 389, 686, 784, 829, 867, 1029, 1218, 1658, 1911, 2058, 4116, 5145, 5774}.
This allows the completion of the calculation using only 51 point additions and 5 point
doublings.
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8.4 Discussion
The solution to the problem of multiplying a point P by a large cofactor c mainly relies
on the existence of a homomorphism ψ(·) that can be computed efficiently. Thus, it is
possible to express c to the base ψ(P ), and the initial problem boils down to finding
a short addition sequence, as in chapter 5. However, in this case it is slightly more
complex as the operations do not occur on a subgroup of Fqk , but on a subgroup of
an elliptic curve. As such, the representation of the curve plays an important role: for
instance, if doubling or adding a point on E′(Fp5) it is likely that affine coordinates
will in fact be faster than any kind of projective coordinates, in which case using
the standard short Weierstrass representation, additions may actually be faster than
doublings [62]. Hence the remarks from chapter 5, on the use of addition-substraction
chains, and on preferring doubling to addition still apply, suggesting that special care
must be taken when choosing how to represent the curve. One should then solve the
problem of the cofactor multiplication, accordingly to the curve representation initially
chosen.
Given an initial hashing to a general point on E′(Fpd), the twist of an ordinary
pairing-friendly elliptic curve E/Fq, this new method for deriving a point of prime
order r in G2 = E′(Fpd), is significantly faster than the naive approach which would
require multiplication by a very large cofactor c = #E′(Fpd)/r. As such, it becomes
really useful in identity based cryptography where schemes often require the hashing
of identities to points on a curve.
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9Conclusion
A scientific observation always leads to a polemic.
G. Bachelard
Throughout this thesis we have been able to link abstract mathematical results
on number theory to applied cryptography. This involved the presentation of pairings
as mathematical maps and their study from both efficiency and security perspectives.
This allowed the construction of a new IBE scheme taking advantage of pairings, and
eventually it was shown that more advanced operations required by their cryptographic
use can be achieved efficiently.
Although first used following a destructive strategy, pairings are really helpful in
the construction of cryptographic protocols, as one can take advantage of their bilinear
property. However, when it comes to implementation, the choice of the parameters is of
a major concern in order to ensure both security and efficiency. In fact, since the speed
of computations on J(Fq) is, to an extent, determined by #J(Fq) ≈ qg and security is
determined by the size of r, for fast implementations one usually wishes to choose J
with r as close to #J(Fq) as possible, i.e with a ρ-value as close to 1 as possible. In
practice one must also take into account the required balance of security for a fixed
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k as well as the cost of arithmetic and pairing operations on the elliptic curves under
consideration.
The case of supersingular abelian varieties of dimension g ≥ 2 defined over non-
prime fields is interesting, as they have been proposed for use in pairing-based cryptog-
raphy for being potentially more efficient than supersingular elliptic curves. Further-
more, note that due to index calculus attacks [53, 54] abelian varieties of dimension
g > 4 are only practical in the context of pairing-based cryptography.
From an application point of view, one of the major implications of the work pre-
sented in this thesis is the possibility of automatically generating efficient pairing code,
given a single number: the security level. For instance, in the case of a pairing cryp-
tographic protocol, one would only be required to input a security level to be matched
and then use the efficient code returned to compute the pairings without any need to
understand the hard underlying problems, or any of their related security and efficiency
issues. This will surely result in more secure implementations as most of the time se-
curity troubles arise from a misunderstanding of the primitives, implying unwanted
weaknesses.
Nevertheless, a few areas can still be explored, especially concerning the security of
the DLP. As a matter of fact, implementing the NFS seems very challenging, due to the
low density of smooth numbers in the sieving space. Thus, as explained previously, a
strategy could be to test how the FFS targeting field of medium characteristic, performs
in practice.
Another idea could also be to take advantage of the special structures of the field
Fqk . Since for the implementation of pairing cryptographic protocols, it is desired that
the embedding degree of the curve is of the form k = 2i3j for some small i and j, it
would be interesting to study how the composite nature of the extensions can effect the
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security.
As suggested by Schirokauer [119], the very specific structure of the polynomials
defining the families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves may also allow some variations of
the special number field sieve to perform more efficiently in practice than the cumber-
some NFS. However, these techniques would probably imply using more sophisticated
ideas than the ones presently known.
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Pairing-friendly elliptic curves
We give a few examples or pairing-friendly elliptic curves matching the usual security
levels.
Supersingular curves:
An example of supersingular elliptic curve over F2m , where m is an odd integer,
with embedding degree k = 4 is given by E : y2 + y = x3 + x. The complexity of the
FFS for this curve is given by L24m(1/3, (32/9)
1/3). The optimal d and B values to be
used are
d =
⌈
2
√
m
(4/9)1/3(2 + log2(m))2/3
⌋
, and B =
(
16m
9
)1/3
(2 + log2(m))
2/3.
MNT curves:
An example of an MNT curve with embedding degree 6 is given in [105]. It is
defined by
p = 801819385093403524905014779542892948310645897957,
r = 801819385093403524905015674986573529844218487823
and the elliptic curve has equation E : y2 = x3 − 3x+ b, where
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b = 237567233982590907166836683655522398804119025399. This curve is suitable for
the standard 80 bit security level, also noted AES-80, as log p ≈ 160.
Freeman curves:
Taking p = 61099963271083128746073769567944870354270161646150914794603 and
r = 61099963271083128746073769567450502219087145916434839626301 leads to the
following Freeman curve E : y2 = x3 − 3x+ b, where
b = 1112775869471458154129950648198203893613615552476491488167. In this case
log p ≈ 196, which implies matching an AES-98 security level.
BN curves:
BN curves being plentiful it is easy to find an x with low Hamming weight such
that p and r are both prime. For example x = 7530900000000019237 can be picked.
The values obtained are
p = 115795057838240340066805193894358654649784083976814007840610649712610075073583
and
r = 115795057838240340066805193894358654649443797247954006102147570112607854700569.
This prime p satisfies the congruences p ≡ 7 mod 8, p ≡ 4 mod 9 and p ≡ 1 mod 6,
hence by [30], these parameters give a curve E : y2 = x3 + 3. Both p and r have ≈ 256
bits, implying an AES-128 security level.
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Appendix B
Implementations
B.1 A linear sieve
Based on the GMP [2] and NTL [126] libraries, the following simple linear sieve, together
with an implementation of the fast Gaussian elimination algorithm, allow to efficiently
solve the DLP over prime fields of size p, with p ≈ 70bits.
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <map>
#include <NTL/ZZ.h>
#include <NTL/ZZ_p.h>
#include <NTL/RR.h>
#include "msv.h"
NTL_CLIENT
Miracl precision(2,0);
#define PRECISION 20
#define LOG2(x) log(x)/log(2)
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typedef struct {
vector<int> index;
vector<int> multiplicity;
ZZ rem;
} smooth_dec;
void read_fb(vector<long unsigned> *fctb, string filename);
void sieve_Fp(ZZ p, vector<long unsigned> *fctb, long unsigned clim, long unsigned qlim);
void SmoothTest(smooth_dec *s, ZZ n, vector<long unsigned> *fctb);
int main() {
int i;
ZZ p=to_ZZ("100000000000000000763");
vector<long unsigned> *fctb=new vector<long unsigned>;
read_fb(fctb, "input.txt");
sieve_Fp(p,fctb,800, 2200);
delete fctb;
}
void read_fb(vector<long unsigned> *fctb, string filename) {
/* rem: elements in the factor base are long unsigned int */
long unsigned int tmp;
ifstream in(filename.c_str());
if(!in) cout << "Cannot open file.\n";
while(in >> tmp) fctb->push_back(tmp);
in.close();
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}
void sieve_Fp(ZZ p, vector<long unsigned> *fctb, long unsigned clim, long unsigned qlim) {
modulo((Big)(char*)"100000000000000000763");
long unsigned i, k;
long unsigned c1, c2;
long unsigned q, qpow, nextqpow, nextp;
long unsigned row=0;
long unsigned d1, d2;
double logq;
ZZ prod;
ZZ rel, relinc, n;
ZZ den, denm, num;
std::map<ZZ,int> *extfctb=new std::map<ZZ, int>;
pair<map<ZZ,int>::iterator,bool> ret;
MSM A;
ZZ H=SqrRoot(p)+1;
ZZ J=sqr(H) - p;
/* Get logs of all factor basis primes. */
double *log_fb=new double[sizeof(double)*fctb->size()];
for(i=0; i<fctb->size(); i++) log_fb[i]=LOG2((*fctb)[i]);
/* initialize extended factor base to factor base */
for(k=0;k<fctb->size();k++) extfctb->insert(pair<ZZ,int>(to_ZZ((*fctb)[k]),k));
/* sieving */
for(c1=1;c1<=clim;c1++) {
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double *sieve=new double[sizeof(double)*clim];
if((double)row/(extfctb->size()) >= 1.1) { delete sieve; break; }
/* denominator and numerator of relations */
den=H+c1;
num=-(J + c1*H);
for(i=0;i<fctb->size();i++) {
q=(*fctb)[i];
logq=log_fb[i];
qpow=q;
while(qpow<=qlim) {
denm=den % qpow;
if(denm == 0) break;
/* InvMod requiers den < qpow */
c2=num*InvMod(denm, to_ZZ(qpow)) % qpow;
if(c2==0) c2=qpow;
nextqpow=qpow*q;
/* Ensure c2 >= c1 to remove redundant relations */
while(c2 < c1) c2 += qpow;
while(c2 <= clim) {
/* Add logq into sieve for c2 */
sieve[c2] += logq;
/* Test higher powers of q if nextqpow is too large */
if(nextqpow > qlim) {
prod = (J + (c1 + c2)*H + c1*c2) % p;
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nextp = nextqpow;
while(prod % nextp == 0) {
sieve[c2] += logq;
nextp *= q;
}
}
c2 += qpow;
}
qpow = nextqpow;
}
}
rel = den*(H+1); // the relation
relinc = H+c1; // add to relation to get next relation
for(c2=1;c2<=clim;c2++) {
n = rel % p;
smooth_dec *s=new smooth_dec;
if(abs(sieve[c2] - floor(LOG2(n))) < 1) { SmoothTest(s, n, fctb); }
if(s->rem==1) {
/* Include each H + c_i in extended factor basis */
ret=extfctb->insert(pair<ZZ,int>(H+c1, extfctb->size()));
if(ret.second==false) d1=ret.first->second;
else d1=extfctb->size()-1;
ret=extfctb->insert(pair<ZZ,int>(H+c2, extfctb->size()));
if(ret.second==false) d2=ret.first->second;
else d2=extfctb->size()-1;
/* Include relation (H + c1)*(H + c2) = fact */
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row++;
for(k=0; k<s->index.size(); k++) A[row][s->index[k]]=s->multiplicity[k];
if(c1==c2) A[row][d1]=-2;
else {
A[row][d1]=-1;
A[row][d2]=-1;
}
}
rel+=relinc;
delete s;
}
if(c1==clim) delete sieve;
}
/* display matrix */
for(i=1;i<=row;i++) {
for (long unsigned j=0; j<extfctb->size(); j++) cout << A[i](j) <<" ";
cout << endl;
}
delete log_fb;
delete extfctb;
}
void SmoothTest(smooth_dec *s, ZZ a, vector<long unsigned> *fctb) {
long unsigned i, j=0;
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for(i=0;i<fctb->size();i++) {
if(divide(s->rem, a, (*fctb)[i])) {
s->index.push_back(i);
s->multiplicity.push_back(1);
a=s->rem;
/* count multiplicity */
while(divide(s->rem, a, (*fctb)[i])) {
s->multiplicity[j]++;
a=s->rem;
}
j++;
}
}
/* s->rem == 0 <=> no factor */
if(s->rem==0) s->rem=a;
}
This code collects the relations and takes the logarithm of the equations resulting
in a large sparse matrix of equations that can be solved using structured Gaussian
elimination.
B.2 The number field sieve
One of the most time consuming stage in the NFS is the factorisation of the norms of
the ideals. Therefore, we efficiently implemented the smooth tests by taking advantage
of the GMP [2], GMP-ECM [1] and FLINT [64] libraries.
First, we defined two main structures, allowing to represent the decomposition of a
given integer and to set which factorisation method should be used.
/* factorization structure */
/* fact -> factors (1st element = the number to be factorized) *
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* val -> valuation of the corresponding factor *
* num -> number of factors */
typedef struct nfs_mpz_fact_s {
mpz_t *fact;
int *val;
int num;
} nfs_mpz_fact_t;
/* factorizing methode structure */
/* td, rho, ecm, mpqs = 0 => disable the method */
typedef struct nfs_fact_mth_s {
int td;
int prho;
int ecm;
int mpqs;
} nfs_fact_mth_t;
Then we fixed the number of iterations used when factorising with the Pollard’s
Rho method to 5000, and set a table containing all the prime integers 2 ≤ p ≤ 5133,
to be parsed during the trial division process. The factorisation stage is implemented
as follows.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <gmp.h>
#include <ecm.h>
#include <flintlib/mpQS/mpQS.h>
#include <flintlib/F_mpz.h>
#include "factorize.h"
//#define VERBOSE
/* trial division */
void factorize_td(nfs_mpz_fact_t *f, mpz_t n) {
#ifdef VERBOSE
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printf("Trial division: in\n");
#endif
int i;
for(i=0;i<PRIME_LIST_SIZE;i++) {
if(mpz_divisible_ui_p(n,prime_list[i])) {
mpz_init_set_ui(f->fact[f->num],prime_list[i]);
f->val[f->num]=mpz_remove(n,n,f->fact[f->num]);
f->num++;
}
}
#ifdef VERBOSE
printf("Trial division: out\n");
#endif
}
/* definition of f(x) for pollard rho */
void prho_fct(mpz_t x, mpz_t n, int a) {
mpz_mul (x, x, x);
mpz_add_ui (x, x, a);
mpz_mod (x, x, n);
}
/*pollard rho */
void factorize_prho(mpz_t f, mpz_t n) {
#ifdef VERBOSE
printf("Pollar rho: in\n");
gmp_printf("n=%Zd\n",n);
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#endif
int i, a=0;
mpz_t x, y, t1, t2;
mp_limb_t a_limb;
/* define fct(x)=x^2+a (a random) */
while (a == -2 || a == 0) {
mpn_random (&a_limb, (mp_size_t) 1);
a = (int) a_limb;
}
mpz_init_set_si (x, 2);
mpz_init_set_si (y, 2);
mpz_init(t1);
mpz_init_set_si(t2,1);
for(i=0; i<RHO_ITERATIONS && !mpz_cmp_ui(f,1) ;i++) {
prho_fct(x, n, a);
prho_fct(y, n, a); prho_fct(y, n, a);
mpz_sub(t1,x,y);
if(i%50) {
mpz_mul(t2,t2,t1);
mpz_mod(t2,t2,n);
}
else mpz_gcd(f,t2,n);
}
mpz_clear(x);
mpz_clear(y);
mpz_clear(t1);
mpz_clear(t2);
#ifdef VERBOSE
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printf("Pollar rho: out\n");
gmp_printf("n=%Zd, f=%Zd\n",n,f);
#endif
}
/* ecm (ecm.h) */
void factorize_ecm(mpz_t f, mpz_t n, long int B1) {
#ifdef VERBOSE
printf("Ecm: in \n");
gmp_printf("n=%Zd\n",n);
#endif
ecm_params param;
do {
ecm_init(param);
ecm_factor(f,n,B1,param);
B1+=5000;
ecm_clear(param);
}
while(!mpz_cmp_ui(f,1) && B1<=50000);
#ifdef VERBOSE
printf("Ecm: out\n");
gmp_printf("n=%Zd, f=%Zd\n",n,f);
#endif
}
/* pollard p-1 (ecm.h) */
void factorize_pm1(mpz_t f, mpz_t n, long int B) {
ecm_params param;
ecm_init(param);
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param->method=ECM_PM1;
ecm_factor(f,n,B,param);
ecm_clear(param);
}
/* william p+1 (ecm.h) */
void factorize_pp1(mpz_t f, mpz_t n, long int B) {
ecm_params param;
ecm_init(param);
param->method=ECM_PP1;
ecm_factor(f,n,B,param);
ecm_clear(param);
}
/* if n is a perfect power try from 2 to 3 */
int factorize_power(mpz_t f, int *val, mpz_t n) {
int ret=0;
mpz_t rem, t1;
mpz_init(rem);
mpz_init(t1);
while(mpz_perfect_square_p(n)) {
mpz_sqrt(n,n);
*val+=2;
}
while(mpz_perfect_power_p(n)) {
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mpz_rootrem(t1,rem,n,3);
if(!mpz_cmp_ui(rem,0)) {
mpz_set(n,t1);
*val+=3;
}
else {
ret=1;
break;
}
}
mpz_clear(rem);
mpz_clear(t1);
return(ret);
}
/* quadratic sieve (flintlib QS as library) (mpQS.h) */
void factorize_mpqs(F_mpz_factor_t *f, mpz_t n) {
F_mpz_factor_mpQS(f, n);
}
/* add factor to the factorization */
/* pr: 0-> factor to add is not prime, 1-> factor to add is prime */
void factorize_add_factor(nfs_mpz_fact_t *f, mpz_t c, mpz_t n, int pr) {
nfs_fact_mth_t methode={0,1,1,1};
switch (pr) {
case 0:
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(c,10)) {
mpz_init_set(f->fact[f->num],c);
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f->val[f->num]=mpz_remove(n,n,c);
f->num++;
}
else {
mpz_divexact(n,n,c);
factorize(f,c,methode);
}
break;
case 1:
mpz_init_set(f->fact[f->num],n);
f->val[f->num]=1;
f->num++;
break;
}
}
/* main factorization */
/* td: 0-> disable trial division, 1-> enable trial division */
/* 0-> f contains n factorization, 1-> n is prime, 2-> factorization not found */
int factorize(nfs_mpz_fact_t *f, mpz_t n, nfs_fact_mth_t methode) {
int i, ret;
mpz_t c;
mpz_init_set_si(c,1);
/* trial division (only if enabled -> no need during recursion) */
if(methode.td) {
mpz_init_set(f->fact[0],n);
f->val[0]=1;
f->num=1;
if(!mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) factorize_td(f,n);
else {
ret=1;
goto CLEAN;
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}
}
/* pollard rho */
if(methode.prho) {
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
else {
do {
mpz_set_si(c,1);
factorize_prho(c,n);
if(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1)) factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,0);
// gmp_printf("rho: c=%Zd n=%Zd\n",c,n);
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
} while(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1));
}
}
// factorize_pp1(factors,tt);
// factorize_pm1(factors,tt);
/* ecm */
if(methode.ecm) {
do {
factorize_ecm(c,n,5000);
if(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1)) factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,0);
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
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if(!mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)) {
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
} while(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1) || mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) <= 28);
}
/* mqfs if size(n)<65digits */
if(methode.mpqs) {
if(mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) <= 65 && mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) > 28) {
F_mpz_factor_t *factors;
factors=malloc(sizeof(F_mpz_factor_t));
factors->fact = malloc(MAX_MPQS_FACTORS*sizeof(mpz_t));
factors->num=0;
for(i=0;i<MAX_MPQS_FACTORS;i++) mpz_init(factors->fact[i]);
factorize_mpqs(factors,n);
for(i=0;i<factors->num;i++) {
mpz_init_set(f->fact[f->num],factors->fact[i]);
f->val[f->num]=mpz_remove(n,n,factors->fact[i]);
f->num++;
mpz_clear(factors->fact[i]);
}
free(factors->fact);
free(factors);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
/* n is too large */
else {
ret=2;
goto CLEAN;
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}
}
CLEAN:
mpz_clear(c);
return(ret);
}
int smooth(nfs_mpz_fact_t *f, mpz_t n, long signed int B, nfs_fact_mth_t methode) {
int i, ret, big=0;
mpz_t c;
mpz_init_set_si(c,1);
mpz_init_set(f->fact[0],n);
f->val[0]=1;
f->num=1;
/* trial division (only if enabled -> no need during recursion) */
if(methode.td) {
if(!mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) factorize_td(f,n);
else {
ret=1;
goto CLEAN;
}
}
/* pollard rho */
if(methode.prho) {
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10) || mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)==0) {
if(mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)) factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
else {
do {
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mpz_set_si(c,1);
factorize_prho(c,n);
if(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,0);
if(mpz_cmp_si(c,B) > 0) big++;
if(big > 1) {
ret=2;
goto CLEAN;
}
// gmp_printf("rho: c=%Zd n=%Zd\n",c,n);
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10) || mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)==0) {
if(mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)) factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
// printf("pollard rho: ");
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
}
}
} while(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1));
}
}
// factorize_pp1(factors,tt);
// factorize_pm1(factors,tt);
/* ecm */
if(methode.ecm) {
do {
factorize_ecm(c,n,5000);
if(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,0);
if(mpz_cmp_si(c,B) > 0) big++;
if(big > 1) {
ret=2;
goto CLEAN;
}
if(mpz_probab_prime_p(n,10)) {
factorize_add_factor(f,c,n,1);
ret=0;
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// printf("ecm1: ");
goto CLEAN;
}
if(!mpz_cmp_ui(n,1)) {
ret=0;
// gmp_printf("ecm2: ");
goto CLEAN;
}
}
} while(mpz_cmp_ui(c,1) || mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) <= 28);
}
/* mqfs if size(n)<65digits */
if(methode.mpqs) {
if(mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) <= 65 && mpz_sizeinbase(n,10) > 28) {
F_mpz_factor_t *factors;
factors=malloc(sizeof(F_mpz_factor_t));
factors->fact = malloc(MAX_MPQS_FACTORS*sizeof(mpz_t));
factors->num=0;
for(i=0;i<MAX_MPQS_FACTORS;i++) mpz_init(factors->fact[i]);
factorize_mpqs(factors,n);
for(i=0;i<factors->num;i++) {
mpz_init_set(f->fact[f->num],factors->fact[i]);
f->val[f->num]=mpz_remove(n,n,factors->fact[i]);
f->num++;
mpz_clear(factors->fact[i]);
}
// printf("mpqs: ");
free(factors->fact);
free(factors);
ret=0;
goto CLEAN;
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}
/* n is too large */
else {
ret=2;
goto CLEAN;
}
}
ret=2;
CLEAN:
mpz_clear(c);
return(ret);
}
This code allows the decomposition into smooth elements of a given integer. It re-
turns 0 if a complete decomposition is found (even if the integer is not smooth), 1 if the
integer is prime and 2 if not all the factors have been found, in particular when more
than 1 large factor is found and the remaining factor is composite. For each integer
it also generates a structure nfs mpz fact t containing the factors, their valuation, and
their number. These will then be used to complete the decomposition into prime ideal.
Note that FLINT ships a Multi Precision Quadratic Sieve (MPQS) which is initially
compiled as a binary and returns large factors, including duplicates and composites.
We adapted this MPQS such that it returns prime factors only, without any duplicates.
Nevertheless, in the smoothness test function, MPQS is disabled by default as it targets
large composite numbers. All the small factors having been removed using the Pollard’s
Rho method and the ECM factorisation it means that the factors found by the MPQS
will be larger than the smoothness bound, i.e. useless.
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